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The Inventory Reform and Peasant
Unrest in Right-Bank Ukraine in
1847–481
DAVID MOON
In 1847–48 the Imperial Russian government reformed serfdom in
right-bank Ukraine (the three ‘southwestern provinces’ of Kiev, Podolia
and Volhynia).2 Inventories — documents that recorded and regulated
peasants’ land allotments and the obligations they owed landowners in
return — were imposed on all seigniorial estates. The inventory for
each estate was based on standard regulations for the entire region.
The aim of the reform was to limit nobles’ power over their peasants. It
served instead to exacerbate the already tense relations between them,
and provoked over three hundred ‘disturbances’ that left traces in the
archival record. At the end of 1848 the authorities revised the
regulations to take account of some of the problems that had emerged.
The inventory reform and subsequent peasant unrest have to be seen
in the context of the historical, social and political situation in right-
bank Ukraine. The region, along with Lithuania and Belorussia, was
part of the territory annexed by the Russian Empire from Poland-
Lithuania in the partitions of 1792 and 1795. The history of right-bank
Ukraine had created a coincidence between religious and ethnic
identities and social divisions among the population of the region. The
vast majority of the peasants were Orthodox Ukrainians, over two-
thirds of whom were seigniorial peasants. Most of the nobles, however,
David Moon is Reader in Modern History at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. His
most recent book is The Russian Peasantry 1600–1930: The World the Peasants Made, London
and New York, 1999.
1 The author would like to thank the British Council, British Academy and the Research
and Small Grants Committees of Newcastle University for supporting visits to Russia and
Ukraine, the staffs of Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (hereafter RGIA), Gosudarstven-
nyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), and Tsentral ∞nii Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv
Ukrainy, m. Kyiv (hereafter TsDIAU) for their assistance, and Professors David Saunders and
Maureen Perrie and an anonymous reader for comments on earlier drafts.
2 The names of the provinces have been anglicized in accordance with P. Magocsi,
Ukraine: A Historical Atlas, Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1985. Other place names are given
in the Ukrainian versions in V. Kubijovyc (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ukraine, Map and Gazetteer,
Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1984, and M. N. Leshchenko (ed.), Selians∞kyi rukh na Ukraini,
1826–1849 rr.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv, Kiev, 1985 (hereafter SR). Where the two
conflict, I have preferred the former. Personal names are given in the likely first language of
their holders, usually Ukrainian for peasants, Polish for landowners, Russian for senior
officials, and one of the three for lower-level officials.
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were Roman Catholic Poles. From the 1790s the officials who
administered the region included Orthodox Russians, especially in the
upper echelons, as well as Poles and Ukrainians. With the exception of
the Poles, national identities were weakly developed. Most Russians,
moreover, did not consider Ukrainians a distinct ‘nationality’.3
The wave of disturbances in right-bank Ukraine which followed the
inventory reform was one of the most serious outbreaks of peasant
unrest in the Russian Empire between the Pugachev revolt of 1773–74
and the abolition of serfdom in 1861. Nevertheless, it has received little
attention from western historians.4 In contrast, there is a large
secondary literature in Ukrainian and Russian,5 much of which, both
before and after 1917, reflects contemporary political attitudes towards
Polish and Ukrainian nationalism, and to the Polish population of
right-bank Ukraine. Many Ukrainian and Russian writers have been
fairly sympathetic to the Ukrainian peasantry, but very hostile to the
Polish landowners, who have been portrayed as cruel to their peasants
and treasonous towards the Russian state.
The aims of this article are threefold. First, it will examine the
inventory reform of 1847–48 as a case study of one aspect of Russian
imperial policy on the ‘Polish question’, paying attention to changing
official attitudes to the Roman Catholic Polish nobility and Orthodox
Ukrainian peasantry. Second, it will consider the inventory reform in
the context of other measures directed at the ‘peasant question’
throughout the Russian Empire, which culminated in the abolition of
serfdom in 1861. Third, it will analyse the relationship between the
reform and the peasant unrest in 1848, focusing on the causes from the
perspectives of the officials who dealt with them and, to the extent that
it is possible, of the peasants themselves. The relative importance in the
causes of the unrest of religious and ethnic divisions, on the one hand,
and of tensions across the social divide, on the other, will also be
considered. In the process, it is hoped to shed light on the part played
3 See D. Beauvois, The Noble, the Serf and the Revizor: The Polish Nobility between Tsarist
Imperialism and the Ukrainian Masses (1831–1863), trans. B. Reising, Chur, Switzerland, 1991
(first published as Le Noble, le serf et le revizor: la noblesse polonaise entre le tsarisme et les masses
ukrainiennes 1831–1863, Montreux and Paris, 1985), pp. 1–3 (hereafter Beauvois); V. M.
Kabuzan, Narody Rossii v pervoi polovine XIX v., Moscow, 1992, pp. 127, 135, 137–39, 149–50;
D. Saunders, ‘What Makes a Nation a Nation? Ukrainians since 1600’, Ethnic Groups, 10,
1993, pp. 101–24; S. Velychenko, ‘Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia:
Who Administered the Borderlands?’, Russian Review, 54, 1995, pp. 188–208 (hereafter
Velychenko); P. S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918, Seattle, WA, and
London, 1974, pp. 3–23 (hereafter Wandycz).
4 For brief accounts, see Beauvois, pp. 30–36; P. Kolchin, Unfree Labor: American Slavery
and Russian Serfdom, Cambridge, MA, and London, 1987, pp. 305–06; O. Subtelny, Ukraine:
A History, Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1988, pp. 211–12; E. Thaden, Russia’s Western
Borderlands, 1710–1870, Princeton, NJ, 1984, pp. 135–37.
5 See O. P. Kryzhanivs∞kyi, ‘Literatura ta dzherela pro inventarnu reformu 1847–1848
rr. na Pravoberezhnii Ukraini’, Arkhivy Ukrainy, 1970, 1, pp. 73–74.
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by Ukrainian peasants, as well as Polish landowners and Russian
officials, in shaping the implementation of the inventory reform.
I
The inventory reform of 1847–48 was part of the general policy of
repression, Russification and reform that was pursued by the Russian
authorities in the empire’s ‘western provinces’ after the Polish national-
ist revolt in 1830–31.6 After the partitions of Poland, the Russian
Senate had declared that the Polish nobility (szlachta) should enjoy the
same rights as the Russian nobility (dvor∞ianstvo).7 This was in keeping
with the traditional Russian imperial policy of co-opting existing social
e´lites in new Polish nobles territories.8 Nevertheless, many kept alive
ideas of a Polish nation and political independence and were disloyal to
their new Russian masters. Polish szlachta in the Russian Empire’s
western provinces were far outnumbered by the local peasants, most of
whom spoke Ukrainian, Belorussian or Lithuanian, and neither
considered themselves Polish nor shared their masters’ aims.
The extent of the gulf between the szlachta and the peasants was
highlighted during the revolt of 1830–31. Very few peasants took part.
Some, especially in right-bank Ukraine, helped the Russian authorities.
They did so out of hatred for their owners, and because they hoped to
benefit. On 19 May 1831 the Russian commander, General-Field-
Marshal Osten-Saken, appealed to peasants to capture and hand over
insurgents, in return for freedom from serfdom. The promise was not
kept. On 28 September 1831 the new ‘Committee for the Western
Provinces’ decided against freeing peasants who had denounced their
owners on the grounds that it would encourage further denunciations
and disorders.9 Reluctance to reward the peasants was not matched by
an unwillingness to punish the Polish szlachta. Following a decree of 1
August 1831, 3,000 estates were sequestered from landowners who had
‘oppressed’ their peasants for not joining the revolt. The estates were
handed over to 138 high-ranking Russian army officers on condition
that they implemented reforms in favour of peasants.10 Most estates
and their peasant inhabitants, however, remained under, or were
returned to, their Polish owners. Later in the 1830s, thousands of
6 Wandycz, pp. 105–32.
7 J. Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century, Princeton, NJ,
1961, p. 461 (hereafter Lord and Peasant).
8 G. Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917, London, 1997, pp. 8–11, 23–30
(hereafter Hosking).
9 T. G. Arkhipova, ‘Komitet zapadnykh gubernii 1831–1848 gody. (K istorii politiki
tsarizma v otnoshenii natsional∞nykh okrain)’, Trudy Moskovskogo istoriko-arkhivnogo instituta,
28, 1970, p. 526; Beauvois, pp. 6–8.
10 Arkhipova, ‘Komitet’, p. 527; V. I. Semevskii, Krest∞ianskii vopros v Rossii v XVIII i pervoi
polovine XIX veka, 2 vols, St Petersburg, 1888, vol. 2, p. 484 (hereafter Semevskii).
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landless szlachta were demoted to the odnodvortsy (part of the state
peasantry).11 This was the start of the abandonment of the Russian
state’s policy of co-opting e´lites in its borderlands.
Since the 1790s, the ‘peasant question’ had been a crucial political
issue in the lands of partitioned Poland. Polish nationalists and the
governments of the three partitioning powers took steps actively to win
peasant support. Polish national democrats tried, with little success, to
encourage Polish landowners to sacrifice their personal interests in
retaining serfdom in the wider pursuit of resurrecting an independent
Poland with peasant support. The partitioning powers played the same
game. Major reforms of serfdom had begun in Prussian Poland in 1823.
The abolition of serfdom throughout the Austrian Empire in 1848
began in formerly Polish Galicia (western Ukraine). In the 1830s, in the
wake of the revolt of 1830–31, the Russian authorities enacted reforms
in the Kingdom of Poland, and began to consider reforms in the
western provinces.12
II
Tsars Alexander I (1801–25) and Nicholas I (1825–55) also contem-
plated reforms of the ‘peasant question’ throughout the Russian
Empire. Nicholas discussed reforms in a series of ‘secret committees’.
The committee of 1839–42 considered a plan by General P. D. Kiselev
to regulate serfdom. In the face of opposition inside the committee, the
plan was watered down. The resulting decree on ‘obligated peasants’
of 2 April 1842 was a half-way house between serfdom and freedom. It
allowed noble landowners, if they wished, to conclude contracts with
their peasants, regulating the sizes of their land allotments and the
obligations they owed in return. Landowners retained police and
judicial powers over the peasants, and could call on the local authorities
if the peasants breached the contracts. The peasants were not given the
same rights if landowners violated the agreements. Few landowners
converted their peasants to the new status. A further measure of
November 1847 allowed seigniorial peasants of estates sold at auction
to repay their owners’ debts the right to buy the estates, and their
freedom. In principle, Nicholas wanted major reform of serfdom, but
feared alienating the Russian nobility if he imposed a reform, or
provoking a peasant revolt if a reform fell short of their hopes.13
11 Beauvois, pp. 97–153.
12 S. Kieniewicz, The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry, Chicago and London, 1969.
pp. 105–12, 58–71, 133–39, 144–57; Wandycz, pp. 118–31.
13 See D. Moon, Russian Peasants and Tsarist Legislation on the Eve of Reform: Interaction between
Peasants and OYcialdom, 1825–1855, Basingstoke and London, 1992, pp. 62–112 (hereafter
Russian Peasants).
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While the Russian government shied away from major reform of
serfdom in the Russian provinces of the empire before 1861, significant
measures affecting peasants who did not belong to noble landowners —
the appanage and state peasants — were implemented in the
1820s–40s. The state peasant reforms were masterminded by Kiselev.
He was a careful and patient reformer, and was concerned to take
decisions on the basis of detailed information about local conditions.
Among other measures, appanage and state peasants were given some
security of tenure of their land allotments, and their obligations were
fixed according to the amount and fertility of their allotments and
general economic condition. The aim of the reforms was to increase
the revenues earned by the appanage department and the state treasury
from the peasants on their lands. Kiselev also saw his reforms as
preparing the ground for the eventual abolition of serfdom.14 In
addition, substantial reforms of serfdom were carried out in parts of the
empire where the noble landowners were not Russian. Earlier in the
century serfdom had been reformed and then abolished in the Baltic
provinces of Estland, Livland and Kurland, where the nobles were
largely German. Unlike most of their Russian and Polish peers, many
Baltic German landowners favoured reform. In 1804 serfdom was
regulated in Estland and Livland. The existing registers (Wackenbu¨cher),
which recorded the peasants’ land allotments and obligations on all
estates, were given force of law. Peasants were granted hereditary use-
rights to their allotments, and their obligations were set according to
the latter’s size and quality. The reform of 1804 provoked objections
from nobles and disturbances among the peasantry. Following petitions
from some landowners and pressure from Alexander I, serfdom was
abolished in all three Baltic provinces in 1816–19. The peasants were
freed from serfdom, but lost security of tenure. In the following decades
there were regular outbreaks of unrest among the free but insecure
Baltic peasantry. The situation in the Baltic provinces went a long way
to convincing Nicholas I, Kiselev and other senior officials that landless
emancipation was not a viable option.15 Nicholas I’s and Kiselev’s
interest in regulating serfdom in the 1830s–40s was, thus, a return to
the earlier policy implemented in the Baltic provinces in 1804.
14 See N. M. Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest∞iane i reforma P. D. Kiseleva, 2 vols, Moscow
and Leningrad, 1946–58; L. R. Gorlanov, Udel ∞nye krest∞yane Rossii, 1797–1865 gg.,
Smolensk, 1986.
15 Iu. Iu. Kakhk, ‘Ostzeiskii put∞’ perekhoda ot feodalizma k kapitalizmu: Krest ∞iane i pomeshchiki
Estliandii i Lifliandii v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX veka, Tallinn, 1988. pp. 179–274; J. Blum, The
End of the Old Order in Rural Europe, Princeton, NJ, 1978, pp. 228–30 (hereafter End).
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III
Following the revolt of 1830–31 the Russian authorities tried to address
the ‘Polish’ and ‘peasant’ questions simultaneously. They wanted to
reduce the power and influence of the unreliable Polish nobility, and to
gain the support of the Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian
peasantry, lest they be won over to the Polish national cause. The social
and political situation in the western provinces, in particular the
disaffection among the Polish nobility, gave Nicholas I and his advisers
the opportunity to introduce the type of regulatory reform of serfdom
they were contemplating for the empire as a whole. They did not need
to worry about alienating the nobility since most Poles were already
disaffected.
The idea of reforming serfdom in right-bank Ukraine was taken up
by two prominent figures. On 29 March 1835 Kiselev sent Nicholas I a
memorandum ‘On the political situation in the South-Western prov-
inces’. Kiselev was familiar with the region as his wife owned an estate
in Kiev province. He warned the Tsar of the growth of opposition
among the Polish population, and argued for decisive action in favour
of the peasants to secure their loyalty. He proposed settling Russian
landowners on estates confiscated from Poles, granting the peasants on
these estates civil rights, and fixing their obligations according to the
value of the land. Regulation of peasants’ obligations could then, he
concluded, be extended to other estates in the region.16
The other prominent figure was General D. G. Bibikov. In December
1837 he was sent to Kiev to serve as governor-general of the three south-
western provinces. Like Kiselev, Bibikov was a military man. Unlike
Kiselev, Bibikov had little experience of peasant affairs, and lacked his
political skills as a reformer. Bibikov’s conduct at the battle of Borodino
in 1812, where he served as adjutant to General Miloradovich, reveals
something of his character. On being asked where he could find
Miloradovich, Bibikov pointed with his left arm to his commanding
officer’s position. His outstretched arm was immediately shot off.
Without losing his presence of mind, however, Bibikov raised his right
arm to indicate, before falling wounded.17 No doubt this story improved
with retelling, but it does suggest a man who was not likely to get bogged
down in petty-fogging details. Count Tadeusz Bobrowski, a prominent
Polish noble in right-bank Ukraine, recalled that Bibikov had poise and
humour, but that he could also be ‘brutal, cynical, and unscrupulous. In
16 A. P. Zablotskii Desiatovskii, Graf Kiselev i ego vremia, 4 vols, St Petersburg, 1882, vol. 2,
p. 4; 4, pp. 146–48.
17 Russkii biograficheskii slovar∞, 25 vols, St Petersburg, 1896–1913, vol. 3, (Bentenkur [sic]-
Biakster), St Petersburg, 1908 [hereafter RBS 3], pp. 23–24.
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every Pole he saw a potential revolutionary’.18 In his annual report to
the tsar for 1839, Bibikov noted that the loyalty of the local peasants to
the throne had cooled since 1830–31, and that action was needed to
secure their allegiance. At the same time the authorities in Kiev and St
Petersburg were receiving many reports on the peasants’ economic
distress and cruel treatment at the hands of their Polish owners. Bibikov
used these as arguments for reform. He took up the idea of regulating
peasants’ seigniorial obligations in estate inventories. Under the Lithua-
nian Statute (the legal system which remained in force in the western
provinces of the Russian Empire until 1840), all estates had inventories
recording peasants’ obligations and land allotments. These inventories
were purely descriptive. Bibikov’s idea was to introduce prescriptive
inventories, similar to the Baltic Wackenbu¨cher, that would limit Polish
nobles’ power to exploit their peasants.19
Preparation of the ‘inventory reform’ began in earnest in 1840 with
discussions in the Committee for the Western Provinces. While the
Committee was inclined towards a gradual approach to regulating
landowner-peasant relations throughout all the western provinces,
Bibikov was anxious to press on in the south-west. On 15 April 1844
Nicholas I ratified the Committee’s proposal to set up provincial
committees of officials and landowners to compile new estate invento-
ries, to be implemented within six years. This gave Bibikov his chance
to force the issue. The estate inventories produced by the three
provincial committees of the region did not satisfy Bibikov. He believed
that they were too varied, were based on inaccurate or distorted
information, and would not prevent the Polish landowners oppressing
their peasants. Instead of compiling and ratifying inventories for all
estates individually, Bibikov decided on a top-down approach. He
drew up standard regulations for the compilation of all estates
inventories throughout the three provinces. Bibikov’s ‘inventory regula-
tions’ were ratified by Nicholas I on 26 May 1847.20 Bibikov chose as
18 Quoted in M. F. Hamm, Kiev: A Portrait, 1800–1917, Princeton, NJ, 1993, p. 65
(hereafter Hamm). Bibikov’s attitudes are evident in his report of 12 October 1848. RGIA,
fond (f.) 1263, opis∞ (op. ) 1 [1848], delo (d.) 1955, listy (ll.) 445–62. See also ‘K kharakteristke
D. G. Bibikova’, Kievskaia starina, 3, September 1882, pp. 61–80.
19 Semevskii, pp. 483–84, 486–88; Beauvois, pp. 17–26.
20 The following summary and other references to the inventory regulations of 26 May
1847 are based on the full original text: RGIA, f. 1261, 1850, op. 1, d. 154–b, ll. 1–16. The
1847 regulations were not published in the Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 2nd series,
St Petersburg, 1830 (hereafter PSZ), and do not appear to have been published in full
elsewhere. For the background and other summaries, see ‘Inventarnye polozheniia
zapadnykh gubernii’, in Pervoe izdanie materialov redaktsionnykh kommissii dlia sostavleniia
polozhenii o krest∞ianakh vykhodashchikh iz krepostnoi zavisimosti, 18 vols, St Petersburg, 1859–60,
vol. 4, pp. 1–7, 60–62 (hereafter ‘Inventarnye polozheniia’); Semevskii, pp. 481–97; E. D.
Stashevskii, Istoriia dokapitalisticheskoi renty na pravoberezhnoi Ukraine v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX
v., Moscow, 1968, pp. 440–58 (hereafter Stashevskii); Lord and Peasant, pp. 460–63;
Beauvois, pp. 6–32; G. L. Yaney, The Systematization of Russian Government, Urbana, IL, and
Chicago, 1973, pp. 169–73.
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the model the inventory of an estate in Radomyshl∞ district, in northern
Kiev province.21 As will be seen, the decision to have one model for the
whole region caused problems.
The first article of the ‘inventory regulations’ of 26 May 1847 laid
down that peasant households were to retain use-rights (pol ∞zovanie) of
all the land they had cultivated over the previous six years. Peasants’
allotments (house and garden plots, meadow and arable land) were to
be recorded in the estate inventories, and could not be changed. The
custom of individual household land tenure, in contrast to communal
tenure that prevailed in most Russian village communities, was
retained.22 As a result of household tenure there were considerable
disparities in landholdings between households in right-bank Ukrainian
communities. Peasant communities also enjoyed ‘servitudes’ (servituty).
These were customary rights of access to parts of landowners’ estates,
for example, to graze livestock in seigniorial meadows after haymaking,
on the stubble in the arable fields after harvesting, and in the fallow
fields and woodlands. Other servitudes included the rights to collect
timber, firewood, mushrooms and berries in landowners’ woods, and
to water livestock and catch fish in their streams and rivers. Servitudes
were referred to as ‘other resources’ (prochie ugod ∞ia) in article 2 of the
inventory regulations, and were to be recorded in the estate
inventories.23
In return for their allotments and servitudes, peasant households had
to serve seigniorial obligations. The level of a household’s obligations
depended on the category it belonged to, which, in turn, depended on
the size of its land allotments (articles 1 and 2). The first two categories
were: tiaglye households, which had relatively large allotments of arable
and meadow land as well as their house and kitchen garden plots and
bore full burdens of obligations; and polutiaglye households, which had
half as much land and correspondingly lower obligations. The sizes of
households’ landholdings were sometimes expressed as portions of an
old fiscal unit (the uvolka, wloka [P]) of around 19.5 desiatiny (roughly 53
acres). This had been a full allotment of land for a household in earlier
times when population densities were lower. By the mid-nineteenth
century, most tiaglye households held between a half and three-quarters
21 M. Kornylovych, ‘Bibikovs∞ki obov∞iazkovi inventari i selianstvo v Volodymyrs∞komu
poviti na Volyni’, Ukrains∞kyi arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk, 1926, 1, pp. 223–25 (hereafter
Kornylovych).
22 I. I. Ignatovich, Pomeshchich∞i krest∞iane nakanune osvobozhdeniia, 3rd edition, Leningrad,
1925, pp. 191–92 (hereafter Pomeshchich∞i krest∞iane).
23 See R. Bircher, Peasant Resistance and the Defence of Servitude Rights in Russia’s South West,
1890–1914, unpublished DPhil thesis, Oxford, 1996, esp. pp. 2–5, 54–55, 103–23. See also
J.-P. Himka, Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century,
Basingstoke and London, 1988, pp. 36–40.
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of an uvolka, while polutiaglye around a quarter of an uvolka.24 Although
this was not mentioned in the inventory regulations, in the southern
part of right-bank Ukraine the categories to which households belonged
depended on their holdings of draft animals. Thus, polutiaglye house-
holds were sometimes called peshie, literally footmen, i.e. households
without draft animals.25 In right-bank Ukraine in December 1848
tiaglie and polutiaglie households comprised 34.5 and 48.75 per cent
respectively of all households on seigniorial estates.26 The next
category, which contained a smaller proportion of households, were
cotters (ogorodniki in the regulations, also known as khalupniki). Cotters
had their own houses and gardens but no arable land. The final
category was landless labourers (bobyli in the regulations, or kutniki)
(articles 1, 11, 12).27 Landowners were permitted to transfer households
to higher categories if they had, or were allotted, the appropriate
amounts of land and possessed sufficient draft animals and workers
(article 22).
The decree of 15 April 1844 had laid down that the level of
obligations was to be determined by the principle of ‘thirds’ (tret ∞iatka):
a household had to cultivate half as much land for its owner as it did
for itself, or pay one third of its income from its land.28 The main
seigniorial obligation of tiaglie and polutiaglie households was labour
services (barshchina, panshchyna [U], panszczyzna [P]), which were calcu-
lated on the basis of so many days’ labour a week from each household
(not individual peasant). In the late 1850s, 97.4 per cent of seigniorial
peasants in right-bank Ukraine performed labour services. The remain-
der paid cash dues (obrok).29 Tiaglie households were obliged to provide
a male labourer with a pair of draft animals to work for three days a
week on the demesne. Polutiaglie households were obliged to provide a
male labourer without draft animals to work for two days. Both
categories of household also had to provide a female labourer to work
for one day (article 2). The regulations stipulated certain norms (uroki)
to be completed in a day, including: ploughing; harrowing; manuring;
24 Semevskii, p. 490; End, p. 95. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, an wloka varied
between 30 and 80 acres. A tiaglyi peasant in right-bank Ukraine was the equivalent of a
kmiec in pre-partition Poland. J. Lukowski, Liberty’s Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
in the Eighteenth Century, 1697–1795, London and New York, 1991, p. 39.
25 Stashevskii, pp. 255–56; O. I. Levitskii, ‘O polozhenii krest∞ian iugo-zapadnogo kraia
vo vtoroi chetverti XIX st.’, Kievskaia starina, 93, July–August 1906, section 1, pp. 267, 268
(hereafter Levitskii); GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, ll. 75–76.
26 See Semevskii, p. 505; ‘Inventarnye polozheniia’, pp. 4–5, 6–7, 60; F. Voroponov,
‘Krest∞ianskaia reforma v Iugo-Zapadnom krae. – Po lichnym vospominaniiam’, Vestnik
Evropy, 1900, 8, p. 760 (hereafter Voroponov).
27 See also Semevskii, p. 490.
28 ‘Inventarnye polozheniia’, p. 7.
29 I. D. Koval∞chenko, Russkoe krepostnoe krest∞ianstvo v pervoi polovine XIX veka, Moscow, 1967,
p. 61.
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sowing, reaping, binding and threshing the grain crop; and mowing,
gathering and stacking hay. Norms were defined by numbers of sheaves
of set sizes for threshing, or by area of land for other work. Some
allowance was made for differing soil types and topography, winter and
spring grain, and good and bad harvests (article 3). All other norms
were measured by time (articles 3 [note a] and 14). Labour could be
commuted to cash dues (obrok) by mutual agreement (articles 26 and
27).
In addition to regular labour services, all able-bodied peasants, male
and female, were also required to work twelve ‘additional days’ at the
height of field work in the summer (letnie sgonnye dni), to a maximum of
two a week. Landowners had to pay peasants for these additional
labour days, and the money was put towards their state taxes (article
7). Rates of pay, which were set by the governor-general and approved
by the tsar, were announced in the spring of 1848. Tiaglie and polutiaglie
households were also obliged to work eight ‘construction days’ a year,
and provide a night-watchman for the estate once a month. Peasants
were to receive recompense (osobye vygody) for these services (articles 8
and 10). Landowners could not demand construction labour days at
times of the year when peasants were working in the fields except in
emergencies (article 9). Cotters and landless labourers were not obliged
to perform regular labour services and had considerably lower
obligations (articles 11, 8 and 12). Any other existing obligations, in
addition to those specified in the inventories, were banned. Labour
beyond that specified in the regulations was permitted only by mutual
agreement, and had to be paid in cash (articles 2 [ii], 29, 15 and 16).
The inventory regulations laid down procedures for enforcement.
Peasants were ordered to obey their landowners and fulfil their
obligations without question (article 36). Estate authorities were to
record the fulfilment of obligations in work books that were given out
each year and, if the peasants wished, on tally sticks (koroby) (articles 37
and 39).30 Landowners or estate managers were responsible for
punishing peasants who breached the regulations, in accordance with
existing legislation (article 40).31
The inventory regulations and estate inventories were promulgated
between late November 1847 and March 1848,32 before the start of the
new agricultural year, with great ceremony. The marshal of the nobility
30 For an example of a work book (for Semen Ignatiev Bychko of Rebedailivka, Chyhyryn
district, Kiev province), see TsDIAU, f. 486, op. 1, d. 13865, ll. 297–99.
31 See Pomeshchich∞i krest∞iane, pp. 52–58.
32 A. K. Koshik, ‘Inventarnaia reforma 1847–1848 gg. i krest∞ianskoe dvizhenie na
Pravoberezhnoi Ukraine’, Nauchnye zapiski kievskogo universiteta, 8, pt. 1, 1949, Istoricheskii
sbornik, 2, p. 105 (hereafter Koshik); A. Z. Baraboi, ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina v 1848 g.’,
Istoricheskie zapiski, 34, 1950, pp. 113, 159 (hereafter ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’); RGIA,
f. 1281, op. 4, 1848, d. 66a, l. 23.
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for the district (uezd, povit [U]) and officials from the district police
(zemskaia politsiia) visited each estate in turn. A special service was held
in the village church, at the end of which the marshal read out both the
regulations and the new estate inventory to the assembled peasants, in
the presence of the district police chief (zemskii ispravnik) and landowner
or estate authorities. The reform was presented to the peasants as a
special favour from the tsar. One set of copies of the regulations and
the estate inventory was given to the landowner or estate authorities,
another was left in the parish church. The priest was entrusted with the
responsibility of answering peasants’ questions about them ‘without
any kind of interpretation’.33 The Orthodox clergy were thus given the
vital function of explaining the regulations to the peasants. This placed
them in an awkward position, caught between the Roman Catholic
landowners and their Orthodox peasant parishioners. There was
considerable distrust between Orthodox priests and the landowners.
Relations between priests and peasants were also tense. Peasants
resented the fees the clergy demanded for rites and services. At the time
of the inventory reform, moreover, these fees were in the process of
being converted to labour services, much to the dislike of the peasants.34
The inventory regulations were also binding on landowners, estate
managers and leaseholders, who were liable to punishment if they
infringed them (article 42). The authorities in St Petersburg and Kiev
anticipated that the Polish landowners would be hostile to the reform.
Landowners were informed of an imperial order of 10 September 1847,
which threatened them with trial by military court if they evaded
implementation. Marshals of the nobility and district police chiefs took
signed declarations from landowners that the regulations had been
announced to them, that they would implement them correctly, and
that they knew the consequences if they did not.35 At the same time
33 For examples, see: ‘Obozrenie Kievskoi, Podol∞skoi i Volynskoi gubernii s 1838 po 1850
g.’, Russkii arkhiv, 1884, 3, pp. 31–33; Semevskii, p. 497; Ia. E. Glukhovskii, ‘Epizody iz
istorii bor∞by krest∞ian s pomeshchikami na Volyni v sviazi s inventarnoi reformoi Nikolaia
I’, Trudy istoricheskogo fakul ∞teta Kievskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta imeni T. G. Shevchenko, 1,
1939, p. 215; SR, p. 263; A. V. Predtechenskii (ed.), Krest∞ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v
1826–1849 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov, Moscow, 1961 (hereafter KD), p. 620.
34 G. L. Freeze, The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia: Crisis, Reform, Counter-Reform,
Princeton, NJ, 1983, pp. 8–9, 81–91, 200–05; idem., ‘The Orthodox Church and Serfdom
in Prereform Russia’, Slavic Review, 42, 1989, p. 373 n. 41; O. P. Kryzhanivs∞kyi,
‘Antytserkovna borot∞ba selian Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy u seredyni XIX st.’, Ukrains∞kyi
istorychnyi zhurnal, 1986, 10, pp. 49–53; [Mikhnevich], ‘Vospominaniia podol∞skogo staroz-
hila o vremenakh krepostnogo prava’, Kievskaia starina, 60, February 1898, section 2,
pp. 50–51 (hereafter Mikhnevich). Relations between peasants and landowners and
Orthodox priests was one of the subjects of an investigation into public opinion by the Kiev
authorities in 1847. TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 797, [1847], d. 61.
35 Semevskii, p. 497; Kornylovych, p. 242; TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 457, [1847] dd. 640, 641,
[1848], d. 96. The attitudes of landowners to the reform was another of the subjects of the
official survey of public opinion carried out in 1847. TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 797, [1847], d. 61.
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peasants were informed that if their landowners oppressed them, they
were to choose two or three representatives to take a complaint to the
district marshal.36 Since the regulations did not grant peasants the right
to complain, and since the legal status of peasant complaints against
their landowners was ambiguous,37 the enforcement of the regulations
depended to a large extent on the character of the local authorities.
The middle and lower level officials in right-bank Ukraine were a
mixture of men appointed by the authorities in St Petersburg, Kiev and
the other two provincial capitals, and men elected by the local
assemblies of the (mostly Polish) nobility. After the Polish revolt of
1830–31, severe restrictions were placed on assemblies of the nobility,
their right to elect officials, and whom they could elect. At the same
time the authorities encouraged the minority of Russian landowners in
the region to participate in noble affairs. The Russian language, law
and administrative practices were introduced. And the law was changed
to allow district police officials to be appointed by provincial adminis-
trations. Many of the appointees were Russians and Ukrainians. After
these measures only a small minority of Poles continued to be involved
in noble affairs and local administration.38 Nevertheless, it was not
possible to change all the marshals and district officials in a few years.
In the 1840s many were still Polish, or acquiesced in the wishes of
Polish nobles.39 Senior officials at provincial level, and the provincial
gendarme officers subordinate to the Third Section in St Petersburg,
were mainly Russians. Some, including provincial governors and the
governor-general, were appointed from outside the region. Most senior
officials were hostile to the Polish nobility (but some took bribes from
them).40 Some were sympathetic to the plight of Orthodox peasants at
36 Iu. F. Samarin, ‘Zamechaniia ob inventariiakh, vvedennykh v 1847 i 1848 v
pomeshchich∞ikh imeniiakh Kievskoi, Volynskoi i Podol∞skoi gubernii, i o krepostnom prave
v Malorossii’, Sochineniia, 12 vols, Moscow, 1877–91, vol. 2, p. 2; Semevskii, pp. 497, 502.
37 See B. G. Litvak, Ocherki istochnikovedeniya massovoi dokumentatsii XIX-nachala XX v.,
Moscow, 1979, pp. 267–75.
38 See Beauvois, pp. 113–37, 171, 206, 217, 218, 221–30; E. Anuchin, Istoricheskii obzor
razvitiia administrativnykh politseiskikh uchrezhdenii v Rossii, St Petersburg, 1862, pp. 207–08;
V. Lukin, Pamiatnaia kniga politseiskikh zakonov dlia zemskikh politsii, pomeshchikov i voobshche
sel ∞skie obyvatelei, St Petersburg, 1857, pp. 9–10; Svod Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1842, 2, pt 2,
appendix to art. 2351; TsGIA, f. 733, op. 88, d. 127, ll. 95–96. For the names of the marshals
of the nobility in the three provinces, see Liubimov, Predvoditeli dvorianstva vsekh namestnichestv,
gubernii i oblastei Rossiiskoi imperii, St Petersburg, 1911, pp. 15–16, 27, 47–48.
39 For Bibikov’s views, see TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 435, 1848, d. 56, ll. 12–13 ob. See also
Beauvois, pp. 23–24, 27, 115–16, 118–20, 134–35; O. P. Kryzhanivs∞kyi, ‘Porushennia
pomishchykamy inventarnoi reformy 1847–1848 rr. (Za materialami Volyns∞koi hubernii)’,
Visnyk Kyivs∞kogo universytetu, seriia istorii, 1969, 2, pp. 105–06 (hereafter ‘Porushennia’).
40 Beauvois, pp. 17–30, 206–13, 216; Velychenko, pp. 195–96. See also J. P. LeDonne,
‘The Frontier Governors-General 1772–1825. 1: The Western Frontier’, Jahrbu¨cher fu¨r
Geschichte Osteuropas, 47, 1999, pp. 56–88.
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the hands of their owners.41 The divided loyalties of officials in right-
bank Ukraine were reflected in peasants’ attitudes to them. Peasants
were very suspicious of lower-level officials, whom they sometimes
believed to be in league with their landowners, but had rather more
faith in the more senior officials, including Governor-General Bibikov.
There were even folk songs praising Bibikov for granting the invento-
ries.42 The mixed composition and allegiances of the officials responsi-
ble for implementing the reform, and peasants’ awareness of the
divisions inside the e´lites, were serious impediments to the success of
the reform.
A further obstacle was the chronically poor relations between the
Orthodox Ukrainian peasants and their Roman Catholic Polish
landowners. There were many peasant ‘disturbances’ in right-bank
Ukraine in the decades prior to 1848.43 The large number of complaints
by peasants suggests that the Polish landowners’ reputation as cruel
and exploitative had some justification.44 Indeed, there was a long
history of violence by peasants (and cossacks) against the Roman
Catholic Polish nobles (and the Jewish population) of right-bank
Ukraine. The most notable examples were the Khmel∞nyts∞kyi revolt of
1648, where peasants joined the rebellious cossacks, and the Koli-
ivshchyna uprising of 1768, when peasants rose up against their Polish
masters after the latter had taken up arms against the King of Poland.
On this occasion, Russian troops crossed the border to put down first
the nobles, then the peasants. In addition, into the nineteenth century,
bandits (haidamaki) raided Polish estates. All these events were enshrined
in the local folklore.45 Tensions inside the population of right-bank
Ukraine were revealed again in 1826. In January 1826, after the
abortive revolt by the Decembrist Northern Society in St Petersburg,
some of their comrades in the Southern Society stationed in army units
41 Iu. I. Gerasimova, ‘Krest∞ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1844–1849 gg.’, Istoricheskie
zapiski, 50, 1955, p. 241; E. A. Morokhovets (ed.), Krest∞ianskoe dvizhenie 1827–1869, 2 vols,
Moscow-Leningrad, 1931, vol. 1, pp. 46, 74, 78; Materialy dlia istorii krepostnogo prava v Rossii,
izvlechenniia iz sekretnykh otchetov MVD za 1836–1856 gg., Berlin, 1872, pp. 35–36, 81, 101,
127–28.
42 SR, pp. 283, 303. For the text of the songs, see V. Ia. Shul∞gin, ‘Iugo-Zapadnyi krai pod
upravleniem D. G. Bibikova’, Drevniaia i Novaia Rossiia, 1879, 6, pp. 104–07 (hereafter
Shul∞gin).
43 See SR, passim.
44 Beauvois, pp. 5–10, 17–24; N. Vasilenko, ‘Krest∞ianskii vopros v iugo-zapadnom i
severo-zapadnom krae pri Nikolae I i vvedenie inventarei’, in A. K. Dzhivelegov et al (eds),
Velikaia Reforma, 6 vols, Moscow, 1911, vol. 4, pp. 95–96.
45 V. A. Markina and V. V. Krizhanovskaia, ‘Krest∞iane Pravoberezhnoi Ukraine v
bor∞be za zemliu i voliu (vtoraia polovina XVII–XVIII v.)’, Voprosy istorii, 1992, 1,
pp. 156–60 (hereafter Markina/Krizhanovskaia); K. V. Chistov, ‘Legenda o Maksime
Zhelezniake’, in idem. (ed.), Narodnye traditsii i fol ∞klor, Leningrad, 1986, p. 241; Z. Kohut,
‘Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the Koliivshchyna (1768) in Recent
Historiography’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 1, 1977, pp. 359–78.
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near Kiev also rebelled, but were easily put down. Local peasants
welcomed the arrest of the rebel officers, and hoped that they were
precursors to the arrest of all nobles in the region.46 In this atmosphere
it is not surprising that the peasants of right-bank Ukraine did not
support the Polish revolt of 1830–31, nor that some peasants took
action against rebels. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth
century, rumours of impending massacres of Polish nobles by peasants
recurred. The rumours turned into reality across the border in Austrian
Galicia in 1846, when Ukrainian peasants took advantage of a new
Polish nationalist revolt against the Austrian government to massacre
their Polish masters on the pretence of loyalty to the Austrian emperor.
Thus, tensions between Polish landowners and Ukrainian peasants
were high on the eve of the inventory reform.47
The most serious impediment to the success of the inventory reform
was thus the combination of the tense relations between Russian
officials and Polish landowners on one hand, and between Ukrainian
peasants and Polish landowners on the other. The situation was similar
throughout the Ukrainian lands of partitioned Poland, including
Austrian Galicia, and, indeed, had been in the Ukrainian parts of
Poland prior to the partitions. On occasions when Polish landowners
were at odds with the state authorities, peasants saw the division in the
e´lites, which usually collaborated to oppress them, as an opportunity to
try to improve their position. All groups, Ukrainian peasants, Polish
landowners and state officials, moreover, were not averse to trying to
play off the other two against each other. The presentation of the
inventory reform as a favour from the tsar to the peasants heightened
tensions across the religious, ethnic and social divide in the rural
population of right-bank Ukraine.
Furthermore, 1848 proved a very difficult year for the Russian
authorities to implement a reform of serfdom in their western
borderlands. Revolutions broke out in much of Europe, causing
considerable alarm in government circles in both St Petersburg and
Kiev that the upheavals might spread to the troubled western provinces.
Nicholas I, in a private letter to Field-Marshal Paskevich (Russian
Viceroy in Warsaw) dated 22 March/3 April, regretted that they had
undertaken the inventory reform. The revolutionary events of 1848
quickly spread to Ukrainian lands under Austrian rule. On 10/22 April
46 M. A. Rakhmatullin, ‘Krepostnoe krest∞ianstvo Rossii i dvizhenie dekabristov’, Istoriia
SSSR, 1977, 4, pp. 127–51.
47 See I. I. Ignatovich, ‘Otrazhenie v Rossii vosstaniia krest∞ian v Galitsii v 1846 g.’,
Sbornik trudov professorov i prepodavatelei Gosudarstvennogo Irkutskogo Universiteta, 5, 1923, Nauki
gumanitarnye, pp. 161–208; N. I. Petrov, ‘Obshchestvenno-politicheskie brozheniia v Kiev-
skoi gubernii v 1846–1847 godakh’, Istoricheskii vestnik, September 1885, pp. 541–56; I. G.
Popruzhenko, ‘Epizod iz istorii pol∞skogo krest∞ianstva (1846–1848 gg.)’, Istoricheskii vestnik,
56, June 1894, pp. 711, 715, 724, 57, July 1894, pp. 119–33.
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the emancipation of the peasantry in Galicia was proclaimed by the
local Austrian governor, on his own initiative, in order to forestall a
similar declaration planned by Polish nationalists for the following day,
Easter Sunday. Nicholas I sent extra troops to right-bank Ukraine from
March onwards, and considered moving into Galicia. In addition, in
the summer of 1848 parts of right-bank Ukraine and Russia were
affected by cholera and crop failures.48
IV
The wave of peasant disturbances that broke out in right-bank Ukraine
in the wake of the inventory reform was recorded by officials involved
in suppressing them and investigating the causes. Certain prejudices
can be detected in the official sources, reflecting the composition and
allegiances of the officials at different levels. Bibikov noted an anti-
peasant bias in the reports, and actions, of local officials.49 Only a few
peasant petitions have survived.
Analysis of the peasant disturbances in right-bank Ukraine in 1848
for the purposes of this article was carried out with the assistance of a
database. Information on the timing and geographical locations of
incidents, as well as the causes of disputes, peasants’ actions, complaints
and demands, as reported by officials, was entered.50 Many historians
have used statistical methodology to analyse peasant unrest, but the
technique has proved controversial. Debate has focused both on the
best methodology to use, for example the unit of counting, and on the
applicability and value of the methodology to such phenomena as
48 A. P. Shcherbatov, General-Fel ∞dmarshal Kniaz∞ Paskevich: ego zhizn∞ i deiatelnost ∞, 7 vols, St
Petersburg, 1888–1904, vol. 4, pp. 197–266, esp. pp. 210, 213–15, 227, 229 (hereafter
Shcherbatov); A. S. Nifontov, Rossiia v 1848 godu, Moscow, 1949 (hereafter Nifontov);
D. Saunders, ‘A Pyrrhic Victory: The Russian Empire in 1848’, in R. J. W. Evans, H. Pogge
von Strandmann (eds), The Revolutions in Europe, 1848–49: From Reform to Reaction, Oxford,
2000, pp. 135–55.
49 TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 435, 1848, d. 56, ll. 12–13.
50 The sources of information entered into the database were: (i) (primary) GARF, f. 109,
4 ekspeditsiia, 1848, d. 110; KD, pp. 602–06, 609–30, 804–11; SR, pp. 261–74, 276–77,
279–300, 302–06, 431–51; (ii) (secondary) ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, pp. 104–08; V. I.
Dovzhenok, ‘Krest∞ianskoe dvizhenie na Pravoberezhnoi Ukraine v 40–kh gg. XIX v.’,
Istoricheskie zapiski, 12, 1941, pp. 156–63 (hereafter Dovzhenok); I. Ia. Fadeev, ‘Krest∞ianskoe
dvizhenie v Rossii v kontse 40–kh godov XIX veka’, Uchenye zapiski moskovskogo oblastnogo
pedagogicheskogo instituta, 27, 1954, Trudy kafedry istorii SSSR, 2, pp. 131–40; Glukhovskii,
‘Epizody’, pp. 214–17; Kornylovych, pp. 246–64; Koshik, pp. 106–20; ‘Porushennia’,
pp. 105–10; M. N. Leshchenko, ‘Posylsennia klasovoi borot∞by v ukrainskomu seli v 1848
r.’, Ukrains∞kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 1973, 2, pp. 46–51 (hereafter ‘Posylsennia klasovoi’).
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peasant unrest.51 The methodology has some value, however, for
analysing large numbers of similar incidents in a particular region over
a limited period on the basis of reasonably even coverage of similar
sources. The unrest following the inventory reform in right-bank
Ukraine in 1848 meets these criteria. Results from the database have
been used not as the main conclusions, but guides to further analysis.
For the purposes of this article a ‘disturbance’ is defined as a joint
action by peasants of a single settlement. Individual villages or
townships (mistechko [U] or sloboda [U]), but not estates, were counted
as settlements. Estates were counted as single settlements only if no
information was available on the number of villages they contained. A
single incident could include several different forms of action by
peasants taken at the same time or consecutively, for example, refusal
to perform labour services and submission of a petition. Likewise, a
single incident could have several causes relating both to different
aspects of the reform and to other factors. If disturbances recurred in
the same settlements, they were counted separately. Thus, there were
310 known peasant disturbances in 305 settlements connected with the
inventory reform in right-bank Ukraine in 1848.52 These figures need
to be treated with caution. First, we cannot be sure that all incidents
were reported to the authorities, or that the reports concerning all
those that were have survived.53 Second, it is likely that some
landowners exaggerated the scale of unrest in their representations to
the authorities in order to discredit the reform by presenting it as a
cause of disorder.54 Since these two points pull the figures in opposite
directions, 310 may be taken as a reasonable indication of the scale of
the unrest.
51 See, for example, B. G. Litvak, Opyt statisticheskogo izucheniia krest∞ianskogo dvizheniia v
Rossii v XIX v., Moscow, 1967; P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Otmena krepostnogo prava v Rossii, 3rd
edition, Moscow, 1968, pp. 41–44 (hereafter Zaionchkovskii); N. N. Leshchenko, ‘Osnov-
nye etapy, napravlennost∞ i formy klassovoi bor∞by v ukrainskoi derevne v epokhu
domonopolisticheskogo kapitalizma’, Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy 1971 g.,
Vilnius, 1974, pp. 333–40; A. M. Anfimov, ‘O metodike ucheta krest∞ianskikh vystuplenii i
kolichestve uchastnikov v nikh’, in S. L. Tikhvinskii (ed.), Sotsial ∞no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie
Rossii, Moscow, 1986, pp. 131–44. For assessments by Western historians, see R. Edelman,
Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia’s Southwest, Ithaca and London, 1987,
pp. 92–93 (hereafter Edelman); M. Perrie, ‘The Peasants’, in R. Service (ed.), Society and
Politics in the Russian Revolution, Basingstoke and New York, 1992, pp. 13–19.
52 Soviet historians working in central and local archives came up with similar figures.
‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, pp. 104–06; Iu. A. Kurnosov, Polozhenie krest∞ianstva pravoberezh-
noi ukrainy i ego klassovaia bor∞ba v 40–50–kh godakh XIX veka, unpublished candidate
dissertation, Kiev State University, 1960, Avtoreferat, p. 15; O. P. Kryzhanivs∞kyi,
‘Selians∞kyi rukh u Volyns∞kii hubernii pislia provedennia inventarnoi reformy 1847–1848
rr.’, Ukrains∞kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 1970, 3, p. 106. Baraboi’s and Kryzhanivs∞kyi’s higher
figures for Volhynia are for both 1848 and 1849.
53 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, p. 105, n. 63.
54 Semevskii, pp. 498–99, 507; Shul∞gin, pp. 99–100; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110,
l. 64–ob.
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The figures can be broken down by province and district to give an
indication of the geographical distribution of the disturbances (see
Table 1 and Map 1). There were 124 disturbances in 120 settlements in
Kiev province, 104 in 103 settlements in Podolia, and eighty-two in the
same number of settlements in Volhynia. When a distinction is made
between the non-black earth districts of the north of the region (most of
Volhynia and northern Kiev province) and the black earth districts to
the south (southern Volhynia, most of Kiev province and all of Podolia)
a pattern emerges. There was an average of only 7.5 disturbances per
district in the less fertile north, compared with 9.2 per district in the
more fertile south. Agriculture, which was rigidly regulated in the
inventories, was more important in the black earth districts in the
south. It is significant, moreover, that the model inventory on which
the regulations were based was from an estate in non-black earth,
northern Kiev province. The regulations, especially the detailed norms
for field work, may therefore have been less appropriate to the black
earth districts. In addition, while the custom of seigniorial labour
services was long established in the northern part of the region, it was
rather newer in the south, which had been colonized by Polish
landowners and Ukrainian peasants more recently.55 The large num-
bers of disturbances in Kiev and Zhytomyr districts (ranked third and
equal fourth) may simply reflect their proximity to the administrative
centres of Kiev and Volhynia provinces. Here unrest was more likely to
come to the attention of the authorities. Kam∞ianets-Podil∞s∞kyi district,
however, which contained the provincial centre of Podolia, had fewer
incidents.
The numbers of incidents can also be broken down by the month in
which they started (see Table 2). The timing can give a general
indication of the causes. Some specialists on peasant movements have
argued that the timing of protests is determined largely by the seasons.
Referring to the rural revolution of 1905–07 in the Russian Empire,
Teodor Shanin wrote of ‘the clear agrarian seasonality of the peasant
revolt. . . Summer is the time to rebel and autumn and winter the time
to retreat.’56 A. V. Dulov examined the timing of peasant disturbances
in the entire Russian Empire between 1796 and 1860. He showed that
peasants were most ‘active’ in May, June and July, and most ‘passive’
in the autumn and winter (see Table 2). While stressing that the actual
causes of disturbances were not connected with the environment, he
55 E. Melton, ‘The Russian Peasantries, 1450–1860’, in T. Scott (ed.), The Peasantries of
Europe from the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Century, London and New York, 1998, pp. 244–45,
252–53.
56 T. Shanin, The Roots of Otherness: Russia’s Turn of the Century, 2 vols, Basingstoke and
London, 1986, vol. 2, Russia, 1905–07: Revolution as a Moment of Truth, pp. 177–79. See also
G. Gill, ‘The Mainsprings of Peasant Action in 1917’, Soviet Studies, 30, 1978, pp. 75–78.
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Map 1
argued that the seasonal cycle of agricultural labour was clearly a factor
in their incidence. At peaks of field work in the spring and summer
landowners put most pressure on peasants, leading to disputes.
Moreover, the steady decline in peasant households’ reserves of food in
the months prior to the new harvest would have heightened tensions.
Crop failures and epidemics, which influenced peasant behaviour,
were also seasonal in their occurrence.57 By rebelling at a key time in
the agricultural year, moreover, peasants may have been trying to exert
maximum leverage on e´lites. Ripe crops had to be harvested straight
away and could not wait.58 Other specialists, in contrast, have stressed
the importance of occurrences outside the villages, such as major
57 A. V. Dulov, Geograficheskaya sreda i istoriya Rossii: konets XV-seredina XIX v., Moscow,
1983, pp. 232–40. On the agricultural year in right-bank Ukraine, see Stashevskii,
pp. 335–37; and in other parts of the empire, M. Confino, Syste`mes agraires et progre`s agricole:
l ∞assolement triennal en Russie aux XVIIIe-XIXe sie`cles, Paris and The Hague, 1969, pp. 69–71,
78.
58 See Edelman, p. 98.
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Table 1: Geographical distribution of disturbances
Province District Black earth/ Nos of Rank
non black earth districts order
Kiev Berdychiv be 8 13
Cherkasy be 15 6=
Chyhyryn be 1 33=
Kaniv be 8 13=
Kiev nbe 20 3
Lypovets be 1 33=
Radomysl∞ nbe 1 33=
Skvyra be 23 2
Tarashcha be 6 22=
Uman∞ be 2 30=
Vasyl∞kiv be 5 24=
Zvenyhorod be 34 1
[sub-total] [124]
Podolia Balta be 15 6=
Bratslav be 8 13=
Haisyn be 8 13=
Iampil∞ be 11 10
Kam∞ianets-Podil ∞s∞kyi be 6 22
Liatychiv be 7 18=
Lityn be 17 4=
Mohyliv-Podil∞s∞kyi be 5 24=
Novo Ushytsia be 0 36
Ol∞hopil∞ be 12 9
Proskuriv be 8 13
Vinnystia be 7 18=
[sub-total] [104]
Volhynia Dubno nbe 2 30=
Kovel∞ nbe 9 12
Kreminaets∞ be 3 27=
Luts∞ke nbe 3 27=
Novohrad-Volyns∞skyi nbe 7 18=
Ostroh nbe 2 30=
Ovruch nbe 7 18=
Rivne nbe 3 27=
Starokostiantyniv be 10 11
Volodymyr-Volyns∞kyi nbe 15 6=
Zaslavl∞ nbe 4 26
Zhytomyr nbe 17 4=
[sub-total] [82]
Total 310
Average number of disturbances per district=8.6
Black earth districts (24)=9.2, non-black earth districts (12)=7.5
Sources: see note 50.
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Table 2: Timing of disturbances
Disturbances
Rt-bk Ukraine in 1848 Rn Emp 1796–1860
Month Numbers Per cent Numbers Per cent
January 22 7.20 205 6.90
February 25 8.10 177 5.90
(Spring)
March 81 26.40 238 7.90
April 23 7.50 281 9.40
May 27 8.80 321 10.70
(Summer)
June 44 14.30 321 10.70
July 63 20.50 354 11.80
August 15 4.90 292 9.70
(Autumn)
September 5 1.60 219 7.30
October 1 0.30 216 7.20
November 0 0.00 186 6.20
(Winter)
December 1 0.30 185 6.20
Total 307 99.90% 2995 99.90%
Sources: Right-bank Ukraine in 1848, see note 50.
Russian Empire, 1796–1860, see Dulov,
Geograficheskaia sreda, p. 233.
The timing of the seasons is based on M. N. Leshchenko, Selians∞kyi rukh na
pravoberezhnii Ukraini v period revoliutsii 1905–1907 rr. Kiev, 1955, p. 90.
political events, in provoking peasant disturbances and affecting their
timing.59
The timing of peasant disturbances in right-bank Ukraine in 1848
(see Table 2) seems largely to have reflected the introduction of the
inventory regulations and the agricultural cycle, rather than events
outside the villages, such as the 1848 revolutions, however dramatic
they seem to subsequent historians. Unrest began immediately after the
regulations were announced. The upsurge of disturbances in March
(26.4 per cent of the total for the year) coincided with the implementa-
tion of the regulations as preparations were made for the start of the
59 See J. Bushnell, ‘Peasant Economy and Peasant Revolution at the Turn of the Century:
Neither Immiseration nor Autonomy’, Russian Review, 46, 1988, pp. 83–86; and J. H. Kress,
‘The Political Consciousness of the Russian Peasantry: A Comment on Graeme Gill’s ‘‘The
Mainsprings of Peasant Action in 1917’’ ’, Soviet Studies, 31, 1979, pp. 574–80.
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agricultural year. The numbers tailed off in April (only 7.5 per cent of
the total), when ploughing and sowing of the spring fields were under
way. The increase in the number of disturbances in June and July (14.3
and 20.5 per cent respectively) coincided with the most intensive period
of field work in the summer. The pressure of summer work was
intensified if, as happened in parts of right-bank Ukraine in 1848, hot
weather caused the winter and spring grain to ripen simultaneously,
rather than in succession.60 More important than the intensity of work,
however, were problems created by the rigid regulation of norms, and
the contentious ‘additional summer days’. There were few disturbances
in the autumn and winter as field work tailed off.
The decline in the numbers of disturbances in April coincided with
the arrival in the villages of right-bank Ukraine of the first news of the
revolutions in Europe. It is likely that peasants initially learned of these
dramatic events from Nicholas I’s manifesto, issued in far-off St
Petersburg on 14 March, that was read out in churches from the end of
March. Closer to home, and more directly relevant to the lives of
Ukrainian peasants under Russian rule, was the abolition of serfdom in
Austrian Galicia on Easter Saturday (10 April according to the Julian
calendar in use in the Russian Empire). Information about this quickly
spread across the border to right-bank Ukraine. The Russian authori-
ties were very concerned that news from Galicia, and other parts of
Europe in the throes of revolution, might influence the peasantry.
There were indeed contacts between peasants living on either side of
the border between the Russian and Austrian Empires. A few estates
straddled the border. The impact of news from abroad, however,
appears to have been rather less than the authorities feared. The end of
serfdom in Galicia seems to have been a major factor in only one
disturbance, near the Austrian border in the village of Shydlivtsi,
Kam∞ianets-Podil∞s∞kyi district, Podolia.61
Despite these findings on the timing of disturbances, the peasants of
right-bank Ukraine were not totally cut off from the outside world and
influenced only by the passage of the seasons. Nevertheless, the
overwhelming majority were engaged mainly in agriculture, perform-
ing onerous labour services for their landowners for part of the week
and working on their own land on the other days. Very few left their
villages to seek wage-labour or seasonal work. What contacts peasants
did have with the outside world were mediated mostly through the
parish clergy, landowners, local officials, tavern keepers, and the
occasional migrant worker or traveller. Peasants’ main concerns were
60 SR, 294; ‘Obozrenie’, p. 34.
61 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, pp. 106–07; Nifontov, pp. 45–110, esp. pp. 69–74,
108–10; SR, p. 448.
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immediate, and throughout 1848 seem to have focused on the impact
of the inventory reform on their obligations and work. The cholera and
bad harvest were also major concerns. Whatever peasants heard about
the 1848 revolutions, and however they interpreted the news, they did
not prompt peasants in right-bank Ukraine to action.
V
The detailed reports on the peasant disturbances in right-bank Ukraine
in 1848 enable us to look in more detail at their causes, or rather the
causes as they were perceived by the officials who wrote the reports.
Official perceptions of the causes of the unrest were important as they
influenced the changes made to the inventory regulations in December
1848, and the future course of attempts to regulate and reform serfdom
in the Russian Empire. During the following discussion of the causes of
disturbances, attempts will also be made to gauge peasants’ attitudes to
the reform. Analysis of the causes is further complicated by two factors.
First, the sources contain information on officials’ views of the causes of
only 170 of the 310 incidents. Second, officials felt that many
disturbances had more than one cause. The main causes arising from
the regulations, as officially reported, can be broken down into a
number of groups: i) peasants considered the new obligations to be
burdensome; ii) peasants were dissatisfied with the pay for additional
summer labour days; iii) peasants and landowners disagreed over the
issue of work books; iv) peasants did not, or refused to, understand the
regulations, or believe they were genuine; v) the regulations were
unclear, inappropriate or impractical in certain situations; vi) some
peasants believed that the reform indicated that the tsar had taken their
side, and/or had issued further legislation; and vii) landowners or
estate authorities breached the regulations (see Table 3). Other factors
that contributed to the unrest included popular memories of the history
of serfdom in the region, harsh treatment of peasants, the cholera
epidemic and partial bad harvest in the summer of 1848.
By far the most important cause of disturbances according to officials
was that peasants believed the new obligations, especially labour
services and additional summer days, to be burdensome. This was a
factor in 123 of the 170 incidents for (72 per cent). The timing of these
disturbances was very closely related to the cycle of agricultural work.
There were seventeen such incidents out of thirty-eight in the spring
for which causes were reported (45 per cent), but ninety-two out of 102
at the height of field work in the summer (90 per cent). The peasants’
dislike of the new levels of obligations was reflected in the forms of
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Table 3: Causes of disturbances (according to official reports)
Causes Number of Disturbances
Peasants perceived obligations as burdensome 123
Rates of pay for additional summer days 9
Work books 8
Peasants ‘misunderstood’ regulations 20
Regulations unclear/inappropriate 13
Peasants believed tsar on their side 4
Landowners breached regulations 38
N.B. Officials reported more than one cause for some disturbances
Sources: see note 50.
unrest. In an overwhelming 255 (82 per cent) of the 310 incidents, they
refused to perform the obligations specified in the regulations. 101 of
the 255 incidents occurred in the spring and 107 in the summer.
In some cases peasants disliked the new obligations because they
exceeded their previous ones. This was the situation on Countess
Branicka’s Liuboml∞ estate, in Volodymyr-Volyns∞kyi district, Volhynia.
Before 1848 peasants on the estate had performed labour services for
only two days a week. The reform increased this to three days for tiaglie
households. Until the reform, moreover, there had been no labour
services for female peasants. In March 1848 peasants on the estate
‘refused to fulfil the labour services fixed (by the inventories)’.62 The
increase in obligations on some estates was an inevitable consequence
of Bibikov’s decision to issue standard regulations for the whole region.
On the estate which served as the model, obligations were around
average for the region, but thus higher than on some estates.63
The next upsurge in disturbances caused by peasants’ resentment at
the burden of their obligations came in the summer. The obligation
peasants found most burdensome, according to official reports, was the
twelve additional days (at no more than two per week) in the summer.
This led to eighty-three disturbances, which comprised 81 per cent of
all those in the summer for which officials reported on the causes. In
July the police chief of Starokostiantyniv district, Volhynia, reported to
Bibikov that ‘in almost all settlements the peasants do not want to work
62 SR, p. 435; KD, pp. 602, 604; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, l. 25–ob.;
Kornylovych, p. 246. The governor of Podolia believed peasants of magnates (like the
Branickis) were better off than those of lesser landowners. RGIA, f. 1281, op. 4, 1847, l. 92a,
l. 33.
63 Kornylovych, pp. 223–25. On obligations before 1848, see V. Hnatiuk, ‘Do istorii
Bibikovs∞kykh inventariv na Volyni. (Z istorii pozemel∞nykh vidnosyn)’, Zapysky Volyns∞kogo
zemleustroiunogo tekhnikumu imeni t. Rakovs∞kogo (Zhytomyr), 1927, 3, pp. 211–12 (hereafter
Hnatiuk); Pomeshchich∞i krest∞iane, pp. 192–94; Levitskii, pp. 254–74.
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the additional days’.64 Moreover, in one hundred cases peasants refused
to work the additional days in the manner laid down by the regulations.
The incidents in which the additional summer days were reported as a
cause were concentrated in the black earth districts in the south of the
region. Only twelve of the eighty-three incidents (14 per cent) in which
the additional days were a cause occurred in the non-black earth north.
Thirty-eight of the eighty-three incidents (46 per cent) occurred in the
ten most southeasterly districts (five districts in each of Kiev and
Podolia). The additional days on top of regular labour services would
have seemed especially burdensome in these parts as regular labour
obligations had been introduced only at the end of the eighteenth
century.65 In 1843 the Ukrainian writer and ethnographer Panteleimon
Kulish met an old man, Kondrat Taranukh, in Smila, Zvenyhorod
district, southeastern Kiev province. Taranukh claimed to remember
the old days when obligations had been much lighter, and there had
been no labour services,66 let alone compulsory additional summer
days. The twelve summer days would also have seemed burdensome to
some peasants as they exceeded the number they were used to working.
Before 1848, some landowners had demanded six or only two.67
Official investigations also revealed more specific reasons for peas-
ants’ objection to the additional days. In the second half of June a
serious disturbance was brewing in the township of Zhabotyn, Cherkasy
district, in southeastern Kiev province (near Smila). The peasants who
refused to work the additional days explained to officials that the extra
work was burdensome as many of them lived in small tiaglie households
with only two adults. Since the husband and wife were already required
to work three and one days’ regular labour services respectively, an
additional two days a week from each would leave them very little time
to harvest their own fields.68 The burden of the labour obligations was
greatly increased by the cholera epidemic. In June one fifth of the
population of Zhabotyn either died or was taken seriously ill, leaving
the rest to do all the work.69
Peasants put forward specific demands concerning their obligations.
In twenty out of sixty-nine disturbances in which I was able to find
information on peasants’ complaints, they protested about excessive
obligations, especially labour services and additional days. Peasants in
twenty-four incidents, including that on Branicka’s estate, demanded
64 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, p. 105, n. 63.
65 Markina/Krizhanovskaia, pp. 159–60.
66 P. Kulish, Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi, 2 vols, St Petersburg, 1856, vol. 1, pp. 96, 143–44.
67 Hnatiuk, p. 211; Kornylovych, pp. 224–25. Additional days began as a voluntary
custom, with food and drink provided by the landowner, but had become an onerous
obligation by the early nineteenth century. Stashevskii, pp. 339–41.
68 SR, p. 279; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, ll. 78ob.–79.
69 ‘Posylsennia klasovoi’, p. 51. See also RGIA, f. 1281, op. 4, 1849, d. 84a, ll. 14ob.–16.
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lower obligations or a return to their previous, lower, obligations. In
nine incidents peasants asked for lower norms or work without set
norms. Peasants in at least seven incidents called for fewer additional
summer days. In Zhabotyn peasants demanded only one additional
day each month.70 In nine incidents landowners were forced to make
concessions to peasants. Landowner Fijalkowski of Zhabotyn proposed
that his peasants work only one additional day a week for cash in hand.
He also allowed them to keep every fourth sheaf harvested in the
seigniorial fields.71
Peasants were dissatisfied with the rates of pay set for the additional
summer days. This was reported to have been a contributory cause in
nine incidents, including those at Zhabotyn, seven settlements in
nearby Tarashcha and Kaniv districts, all in southern Kiev province,
and Vily Iaruz∞ki, Iampil∞ district, in southern Podolia. In Zhabotyn,
the peasants compared the rates unfavourably with those for freely-
hired labour. Peasants in Vily Iaruz∞ki also demanded to be paid
immediately, rather than have the pay put towards their taxes, as laid
down in the regulations.72 The rates of pay for the additional summer
days were confirmed by Nicholas I on 7 April 1848 and published by
Bibikov in Kiev on 10 May. They were set at 15 or 10 silver kopeks for
one day’s male labour with draft animals for norm and non-norm
labour respectively, 10 or 7.5 silver kopeks for a day’s male or female
work without draft animals, and between 3 and 5 kopeks for child
labour (see Table 4).73 The peasants’ complaints that these rates were
low were true. In 1845–47 Bibikov’s chancellery had gathered
information on existing rates for summer work. In Kiev province the
average pay for a day’s non-norm labour with draft animals was 22.5
kopeks, and without draft animals, 13.5 kopeks. In Podolia the
corresponding figures were 28 and 16 kopeks, and in Volhynia, 26 and
15 kopecks. Other sources, however, contain data on higher rates for
freely hired labour at harvest time in parts of the region. The survey of
Volhynia by the Imperial General Staff in the late 1840s reported that
daily rates were 30–40 kopeks with draft animals and 20 kopeks
without.74 It is significant that all the disturbances provoked by the
rates of pay for the additional days noted above took place in the
southeastern part of the region. Not only were the going rates of pay
there higher than those set by Bibikov, but this was the only part of
70 SR, pp. 269, 279, 295.
71 SR, p. 289.
72 SR, pp. 279, 292–93, 295, 297, 304.
73 TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 435 [1848], d. 16, ll. 57–58ob. See also ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’,
p. 117.
74 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, p. 117; I. O., Hurzhii, Rozklad feodal ∞no-kriposnits∞koi sistemy
v sil ∞skomu hospodarstvi Ukrainy pershoi polovyny XIX st., Kiev, 1954, pp. 300–01.
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Table 4: Rates of pay for ‘additional summer days’
(All figures in silver kopeks for a day’s labour)
Type of labour Initial proposal by Proposal by Official rates
Bibikov Mr Int Affs 7 April 1848
28 Mar 1848
Kiev Podolia Volhynia (all 3 provs) (all 3 provs)
1. Male, with draft
animals, tasks 10–15k 15–30k 15–20k 12–15k (min) 15k
2. Male, with draft
animals, w/o tasks 10–15k 15–30k 15–20k 12–15k (min) 10k
3. Male, w/o draft
animals, with tasks 7.5–10k 7.5–25k 12.5–15k 8k (min) 10k
4. Male, w/o draft
animals or tasks 7.5–10k 7.5–25k 12.5–15k 8k (min) 7.5k
5. Female, tasks 7.5–10k 5–10k 10k 6k (min) 10k
6. Female, w/o
tasks 7.5k–10k 5–10k 10k 6k (min) 7.5k
7. Child 3–5k 5–7.5k 3–5k 6k (min) 3–5k
Sources: RGIA, f. 1263, op. 1, 1848, d. 1949, 1.310 ob
right-bank Ukraine where wage labour was common. Moreover, it
adjoined New Russia (southern Ukraine), where there were plenty of
opportunities for paid work, and rates of pay were relatively high.75
Some landowners in Balta district, the most southerly in Podolia, paid
peasants double the governor-general’s rates for additional summer
days.76
There was a widespread rumour that the low official rates for the
additional summer days were influenced by some landowners in
Volhynia who had given Pisarev, the official in charge of Bibikov’s
chancellery, a bribe of 35,000 silver roubles in 1847. News of the bribe
reached St Petersburg, but Pisarev was not dismissed because it was
known that Bibikov would then resign as he was a ‘very close friend’ of
75 B. G. Pliushchevskii, Krest ∞ianskie otzhozhie promysly na territorii evropeiskoi Rossii v poslednie
predreformennye desiatiletiia (1830–1850 gg.), unpublished doctoral dissertation, Leningrad
State University, 1974, pp. 98–101, 105–09; E. I. Druzhinina, Iuzhnaia Ukraina v period
krizisa feodalizma 1825–1860 gg., Moscow, 1981, pp. 26–28.
76 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, p. 108.
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Pisarev’s wife.77 Another explanation for the divergences between the
pay set by the authorities in the spring of 1848 and the going rates can
be found in the records of the session of the Committee of Ministers in
St Petersburg on 28 March 1848 which set the rates. Bibikov had
recommended that the Committee set different rates for different
districts to reflect variations in local conditions. The governor-general
was pressing for a decision, moreover, because he needed to announce
the rates as soon as possible to avoid misunderstandings and disorders.
The minister of internal affairs was not happy with Bibikov’s recom-
mendation. He argued that, since the additional summer days were
compulsory, the rates of pay should be less than for freely hired labour.
He also disliked the idea of differential rates, and proposed minimum
rates for all three provinces. Bibikov responded by setting the rates he
had proposed for Kiev province, which were the lowest, for the entire
region (see Table 4).78 Perhaps a hint of exasperation can be detected
in Bibikov’s precipitate action.
Closely related to the peasants’ perception of their obligations as
burdensome were disputes over the issue and filling in of the work
books in which their obligations were recorded. This was a cause in
eight incidents. In twenty-one incidents, moreover, peasants refused to
accept the books. In most cases it was the books themselves that caused
the problems. Sixteen of the twenty-one incidents occurred in Cher-
kasy, Chyhyryn, Kaniv and Kiev districts, Kiev province, which lay
along the right-bank of the river Dnieper, directly opposite left-bank
Ukraine. In Rebedailivka, on the estate of landowner Trypolski in
Chyhyryn district, officials carried out an exhaustive investigation to
find out why the peasants refused to take the books. Several dozen
peasants were questioned. Most of their statements reveal a great
reluctance to admit to anything that might be used against them.
Nevertheless, a number of reasons recur: the books were written by
hand rather than printed; they had the crest of their landowner and not
the state or the tsar; the books set the number of days’ labour services
at four-five a week, i.e. higher than laid down in the regulations; books
had not been issued in other villages; and peasants in other villages
were also refusing to take them. All the peasants were very suspicious
of the books. Some believed them to be ‘false’.79 Perhaps the most
striking reason Rededailivka peasants gave was that ‘once [. . .] across
the Dnieper in Little Russia [left-bank Ukraine] those who took the
books remained serfs [. . .], but those who did not [. . .] remained free
77 Voroponov, p. 761; P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Pravitel ∞stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v
XIX v., Moscow, 1978, p. 147.
78 RGIA, f. 1263, op. 1, 1848, d. 1935, ll. 76–95; f. 1263, op. 1, 1848, d. 1949, ll. 300–2ob.
79 TsDIAU, f. 485, op. 1, 1849, d. 13865, esp. ll. 31–ob, 54, 57ob, 95ob–96, 100ob, 127ob,
249–ob.
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cossacks’. Peasants claimed they had been told this by passing migrant
workers from left-bank Ukraine.80 The same story was current in
Zhabotyn and other parts of neighbouring Cherkasy district.81 The
story was probably based on the introduction of the poll tax to left-
bank Ukraine in 1783. All peasants and cossacks who were entered into
the records of the fourth revision of the tax census of 1782–83 were
bound to their places of residence. Many were later enserfed. The loss
of freedom and cossack status became part of Ukrainian folklore.82
The peasants’ reluctance in 1848 to accept the books that recorded
their obligations according to the inventory regulations was typical of
reactions by illiterate people to written documents. Commenting on
circumstances that provoked popular revolts in early-modern Europe,
Yves Marie Berce wrote: ‘Not understood, [the written document] is,
at the same time, admired and feared. Men ascribe to it a direct and
magical power; it proves, establishes, founds and binds, not by its
contents, but by its very form.’83 During many revolts illiterate peasants
have destroyed documents, such as title deeds and tax records.84 The
suspicions peasants in right-bank Ukraine felt towards their landowners
and local officials increased their fear of being tricked into taking
documents that confirmed, rather than limited, the authority of their
owners to extract obligations from them. A little over a decade later,
after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, many peasants in right-bank
Ukraine (and elsewhere) refused to sign the ‘regulatory charters’
(ustavnye gramoty), which set the sizes of their land allotments and
obligations for the next stage of the reform.85
Closely related to peasant attitudes to written documents was the
issue of how peasants understood, or misunderstood, their contents. A
significant number of disturbances following the inventory reform
seemed to officials to have been caused, at least in part, by peasants’
failing to understand the inventory regulations. This appears to have
been a factor in twenty (12 per cent) of the 170 incidents for which
officials reported on the causes.
80 TsDIAU, f. 485, op. 1, 1849, d. 13865, ll. 124ob.–125; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848,
d. 110, ll. 92 ob., 98; see also KD, p. 610; SR, p. 271.
81 Dovzhenok, pp. 160–61; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, l. 62ob; TsDIAU, f. 442,
op. 435, 1848, d. 111.
82 PSZ, series 1, 21, no.15724 [1783], esp. pt. 1, art. 8; Z. Kohut, Russian Centralism and
Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate 1760s–1830s, Cambridge, MA, 1988,
pp. 242, 277–79, 296–98; I. de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, London,
1981, pp. 311–15.
83 Y. M. Berce, Revolt and Revolution in Early Modern Europe: An Essay on the History of Political
Violence, J. Bergin (trans.), Manchester and New York, 1987, pp. 111–12.
84 See, for example, J. C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in
South East Asia, New Haven, CT, and London, 1976, pp. 144–45.
85 N. N. Leshchenko, Krest∞ianskoe dvizhenie na Ukraine v sviazi s provedeniem reformy 1861 goda,
Kiev, 1959, pp. 266–346; A. Z. Baraboi et al (eds), Otmena krepostnogo prava na Ukraine: Sbornik
dokumentov i materialov, Kiev, 1961, pp. 225–83, esp. 266–71 (hereafter Otmena).
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The problem of peasants’ understanding of the regulations was
compounded by the fact that they were written, in officialese, and in
Russian. The largely illiterate, uneducated, and Ukrainian peasants
therefore had difficulty understanding them on three counts.86 Many
Russian officials, including Bibikov, believed that the Ukrainian
language was a dialect of Russian spoken by peasants or ‘Russian [. . .]
distorted by Polish’.87 Moreover, after the suppression of the Kirillo-
Methodian Society at Kiev University in 1847, the Russian authorities
severely restricted publishing in Ukrainian.88 Nevertheless, some
officials recognized that Ukrainian peasants spoke a language other
than Russian, and that they needed to use it if they were to
communicate effectively with peasants. Syvyts∞kyi, an official for special
assignments attached to Bibikov who was sent to Zhabotyn in July
1848, was concerned that the peasants had not understood the
regulations. He ordered the parish priest to read them out ‘as slowly as
possible’ in order to get their literal contents across to the peasants.
Syvyts∞skyi also saw fit to explain the regulations to the peasants in ‘a
language (iazyk) intelligible for their comprehension’.89 The language
problem may have been the reason the authorities entrusted the
Orthodox parish clergy, who spoke Ukrainian to their parishioners,90
with the task of explaining the inventory regulations to the peasantry.
This merely added to the problem. Some peasants suspected that their
priests were in league with the landowners and local officials, whom
they did not trust. They refused to believe that the regulations or the
priests’ explanations were genuine, suspecting the clergy of concealing
the ‘real’ regulations.91 Shortly after the introduction of the reform, the
tsar banned priests from explaining the regulations to peasants lest this
cause disturbances. The ban was not announced to the peasants, who
86 For a similar problem in southern France, where peasants spoke ‘patois’, see P. M.
Jones, The Peasantry in the French Revolution, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 208–10.
87 Hamm, p. 67; RGIA, f. 1180, op. XV, d. 74, l. 100ob.; B. Dmytryshyn, Introduction to
F. Savchenko, Zaborona Ukrainstva 1876 r., Reprint, Munich, 1970, p. xvi. On the ‘blend’ of
Slavonic languages spoken in the city of Kiev at this time, see Hamm, pp. 100–06.
88 D. Saunders, ‘The Kirillo-Methodian Society’, Slavonic and East European Review, 71,
1993, pp. 689–91.
89 SR, p. 289. (I have Ukrainianized his name.) During serious disturbances in Kiev
province in 1855, Captain Gromeka was sent to the villages because he could speak ‘Little
Russian’. S. S. Gromeka, Kievskie volneniia v 1855 godu, St Petersburg, 1863, pp. 3, 7. In 1861,
the government took an interest in P. A. Kulish’s proposal to translate the statutes
abolishing serfdom into Ukrainian. ‘Perevod P. A. Kulisha na ukrainskii iazyk manifesta 19
fevralia 1861 goda i polozheniia o krest∞ianakh’, Kievskaia starina, 88, January–March 1905,
pp. 324–37, 423–60.
90 See, for example, L. M[atsevich], ‘Zametki k istorii kievskoi kozachchiny 1855 g.’,
Kievskaia starina, 88, January–March 1905, p. 58.
91 Kryzhanivs∞kyi, ‘Antytserkovna borot∞ba’, pp. 49, 52–53.
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seem to have taken priests’ subsequent refusals to explain the regula-
tions as further evidence for their collusion.92
Closer examination of incidents in which peasants’ misunderstand-
ings of the regulations were a factor suggests that they fall into two
categories. In some cases, peasants’ misunderstandings appear to have
been unintentional. This was Bibikov’s view.93 In others, however,
peasants seem to have been unwilling, rather than unable, to under-
stand what was announced to them. In Zozulyntsi, Berdychiv district,
Kiev province, it is likely that the peasants’ misunderstanding were
inadvertent, and that lack of access to the text of the regulations, rather
than the language, was one of the causes of the incident. When the
peasants started to harvest the winter grain on 2 July, peasant Stefan
Dyshliuk told the others that they did not have to reap sixty sheaves in
a day, as landowner Abramowicz had told them (and as had been laid
down by Bibikov). Instead, Dyshliuk stated that men had to reap fifty
sheaves and women only forty. An investigation revealed that the
misunderstanding had arisen because the steward had confused the
norms set for threshing with those for reaping (article 3, vi–viii). The
steward may have been confused because Bibikov had changed the
way the reaping norms were calculated, from area of land to numbers
of sheaves, after the regulations were first announced. Moreover,
reaping norms of fifty sheaves had allegedly been announced in
Hrushka, Ol∞hopil∞ district, Podolia. The peasants tried in vain to force
their priest to read the regulations to them to clarify the issue, but he
was no longer permitted to do so.94
In rather more cases peasants’ misunderstandings of the regulations
may have been deliberate. Thirteen of the twenty such incidents began
between late February and the beginning of April. This suggests that
peasants were particularly reluctant to understand, or accept, the
regulations when they were being implemented at the start of the
agricultural year.95 The other seven incidents took place in June and
July. Refusal to understand the burden of the labour obligations
peasants were required to perform at the height of field work in the
summer may have been a thinly veiled form of protest against them.
Peasants who had previously served lighter obligations than those laid
down by the regulations had good reason to have problems ‘under-
standing’ them as the authorities had presented the reform as a ‘favour’
92 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, p. 115; Mikhnevich, pp. 50–51; N., ‘Ukrainskaia derevnia
vtoroi chetverti nyneshnego stoletiia (po vospominaniiam detstva)’, Kievskaia starina, 4,
October, 1882, pp. 63–64; TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 451, 1848, dd. 20, 55, 115.
93 TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 435, 1848, d. 56, l. 12–ob.
94 SR, pp. 282–83; Kornylovych, p. 229; KD, p. 620. There were many mistakes in the
copies of the regulations given to landowners. GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, l. 80–ob.
95 See also Pomeshchich∞i krest∞iane, p. 209.
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from the tsar. Peasants were also reluctant to believe that the regulations
which had been read out by the district-level officials were genuine.
They were aware of the divided loyalties of these officials, whom they
sometimes believed to be in league with the landowners, and were
therefore very suspicious of their actions.96 In March, peasants in
Illiashivka, Lityn district, Podolia, demanded that the spring wheat
they had been ordered to thresh be considered as winter wheat.97 They
presumably knew full well that the regulations required them to thresh
fewer sheaves of the latter (article 3, vii and viii). In Hrushka, Ol∞hopil∞
district, Podolia, officials allowed a literate peasant, Pavlo Kushnira, to
read the regulations in the hope that he would then persuade the others
to obey them. District police chief Szuszkiewicz reported that this
failed, since the other peasants ‘almost punished [Kushnira] because
he understood the regulations even before he had taken [them] from
the estate office’.98 This incident suggests that Kushnira knew all along
what the regulations had laid down, but that the other peasants
preferred their own interpretation, regardless of their actual content.
Throughout 1848 some officials and landowners suspected that some
peasants were wilfully misinterpreting the inventory regulations to their
advantage.99 Deliberate misunderstandings of legislation can be inter-
preted as attempts by peasants to resist what they saw as unjust laws, to
articulate grievances and aspirations, and to take advantage of
opportunities.100
A further contributory factor behind the unrest reported in the
official documents, and an additional cause of misunderstandings, was
that on some estates and in certain situations the regulations were
unclear, inappropriate or impractical. This was a factor in thirteen
incidents, ten of which occurred in the spring, the other three in the
summer. It was not clear in the regulations whether the norms set for
threshing included winnowing, i.e. separating grain from the chaff as
well as from the straw. This led to a dispute in Potaptsy, Kaniv district,
Kiev province. On 17 March on the instigation of peasant Volodymyr
Cherep, twenty-five peasants went home at three o’clock in the
afternoon having threshed, but not winnowed, the allotted number of
sheaves.101 The terms of the peasants’ obligation to work construction
labour days were also unclear. Except in emergencies, landowners
were not permitted to demand construction days during ‘times of field
96 SR, pp. 283, 303.
97 KD, pp. 623–24; SR, p. 437.
98 KD, p. 618.
99 See, for example, GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, ll. 44ob.–45; KD, p. 615; SR, pp. 285,
299.
100 For discussion of this phenomenon among Russian peasants, see Russian Peasants.
101 SR, pp. 273–74; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, l. 77ob.
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work’ (article 9). The regulations did not, however, specify what
constituted field work. In mid-March, thirty peasants from Trybusivka,
Ol∞hopil∞ district, Podolia, were sent to build a dam a few miles from
the village. Preparations for the spring ploughing would have been
under way by this time.102 The peasants did no work, and ran off after
beating up an estate official sent to check their progress.103 The
regulations were also unclear on how many construction days a
landowner could demand in a week. Peasants in Ivanivtsi, Lityn district,
Podolia, refused to spend more than three days a week strengthening a
dam which was threatened, and subsequently breached, by the spring
floods.104
The regulations on measuring labour norms during the harvest
turned out to be inappropriate and impractical. They stated that a
peasant was to reap 1/9 desiatina or 1/5 morg (approximately 3/10 acre)
in one day (article 3, vi). On some estates, however, the land had not
been accurately surveyed. Consequently, on 30 May 1848 Bibikov
changed harvesting norms to the number of sheaves to be reaped in a
day, which he set at sixty.105 The change did not prevent problems
arising. In addition to the incident in Zozulyntsi, in Kydanivka, Kaniv
district, Kiev province, in July the peasants rejected new harvesting
norms. They insisted instead on harvesting the area originally specified.
When they found that this was not to their advantage, however, they
refused to accept the new norms, and harvested as much as they
wanted.106 The new norms, measured in sheaves rather than areas of
land, were impractical in the event of natural disasters. Kydanivka, like
Zhabotyn, was badly affected by cholera, which reduced the numbers
of peasants fit to work in the fields.107 The new harvesting norms were
also inflexible if the crops grew badly. In Vily Iaruz∞ki, Iampil∞ district,
Podolia, peasants Iurko Luk∞ianiv and Vasyl Nahirniak told officials
that it was very difficult to reap sixty sheaves in a day as the grain was
thin on the ground.108 On 13 July Bibikov reported to St Petersburg
that cholera had spread to many places, that there were insufficient
means to aid the sick, and that the epidemic had coincided with the
height of field work. He added that the drought had burned up the hay
and ripened the spring grain. As a result ‘landowners are hurrying to
102 Ol∞hopil∞ district was in the far south of the region. Further north, in Vinnytsia district,
Podolia, ploughing began around 24 March. Stashevskii, p. 335.
103 KD, p. 614.
104 KD, p. 623.
105 Kornylovych, p. 229.
106 SR, pp. 302–03. See also GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, ll. 76ob.–77.
107 SR, p. 304.
108 SR, pp. 295–97; KD, pp. 626–27. The harvest in Podolia was lower than in 1846 and
1847. RGIA, f. 1281, op. 4, 1847, d. 92a, ll. 88ob.–90; 1848, d. 69a, ll. 89ob.–91; 1849,
d. 130a, ll. 104ob.–106.
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gather in all at one go in order not to lose grain. The peasants, who
have lost spirit, are in no condition to do all the work at once, for there
are not enough working hands’.109
An important respect in which the inventory regulations were
inappropriate and impractical stemmed from the criteria laid down for
dividing households into categories with different levels of obligations.
Before the reform on some estates there had been other categories
besides those listed in the regulations. According to the regulations,
moreover, households were divided according to the size of their
allotments. Categories had been determined in this way in the northern
part of the region where the model for Bibikov’s standard inventory
came from. In the south, however, categories were based on ownership
of draft animals. Some peasants felt that tiaglie households were
disproportionately burdened with labour services relative to polutiaglie.
Peasants’ discontent with the categories to which they had been
assigned, or with the corresponding level of obligations, was a cause of
seven incidents. One occurred in the northern part of the region, and
involved a dispute over peasants’ land allotments. The other six took
place in the southern part of the region, and most concerned draft
animals.110
In February in Kustivtsi village and Kustovets∞ka township, Vinnytsia
district, Podolia, peasants who had been classified as tiaglie considered
themselves to be polutiaglie, and worked two rather than three days a
week. They initially claimed they belonged to the latter category
because their draft animals were too young to work. District marshal of
the nobility Szydlowski reported the incident to Bibikov, and asked
whether households with tiaglie allotments but no draft animals were to
work two or three days. In the meantime Szydlowski told the estate
manager that households without draft animals were to work only two
days. This seems to have raised the hopes of other tiaglie households in
the settlements. In late May the district police chief reported to Bibikov
that hardly any of the tiaglie households were working three days, and
that the peasants at issue had accumulated a backlog of 1,352 unworked
days. Tiaglie households were now claiming not only that they did not
have animals fit for work but that they did not have sufficient land.
After their initial success, however, it seems that the peasants pushed
their case too far. A subsequent investigation decided that they had
been ‘deceitful’.111 In Samhorodok, Cherkasy district, Kiev province,
tiaglie households threatened to sell off their draft animals so that they
would become polutiaglie, with lower labour obligations.112
109 GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, l. 54–ob.
110 GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, ll. 75–76ob.; ‘Porushennia’, p. 108; SR, p. 432.
111 KD, pp. 613–14, 688; SR, pp. 276–77.
112 GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, l. 11. See also Semevskii, p. 502.
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The incidents in which lack of clarity, inappropriate and impractical
regulations were factors reflected both the peasants’ discontent with
the level of obligations demanded, and the problems caused by
Bibikov’s decision to impose standard regulations based on one estate
on all estates throughout the region, without regard to existing
practices, and without taking into account varying natural conditions,
or allowing for natural disasters.
In contrast to problems with parts of the regulations and some
peasants’ seeming difficulty in understanding them, other peasants
were well aware that the main aim of the reform was to benefit them at
the expense of their Polish landowners. Indeed, the reform had been
presented as a favour from the tsar when it was promulgated. This was
a factor in at least four incidents. In late 1847 General Buxhoeweden
of the Corps of Gendarmes reported that the preparation of the reform
had raised peasants’ hopes that the government intended ‘soon to free
them from serfdom’.113 In March, on Branicka’s estate in Volodymyr-
Volyns∞kyi district, Volhynia, peasants backed up their demands by
telling officials that ‘times have changed, and now the sovereign is
standing firmly behind the peasants’.114 It was a short step to the belief
that the tsar had issued further legislation in their interests. In Zhabotyn
in June peasants claimed that there was a new decree, which granted
them freedom from all obligations.115 This may not have been just
wishful thinking. The announcements of the rates of pay for additional
summer days and the change in the harvesting norms, after the
regulations were promulgated, would have provided grounds for the
belief in a new ‘decree’.
In addition to the inventory reform, peasants in right-bank Ukraine
had other reasons to have some faith in the Russian tsar. The reform
was the latest of several actions by the Russian authorities against
Polish landowners, which Ukrainian peasants interpreted as being in
their favour. In 1768 and 1831 Russian troops had been sent against
Polish nobles in right-bank Ukraine. Although the peasants’ hopes of
further action against their masters had been dashed on both occasions,
they may have been revived by various measures concerning state and
church peasants enacted throughout the nine western provinces in the
1840s. In 1841 and 1843 estates belonging to the Roman Catholic
Church were secularized and handed over to the Ministry of State
Domains. There had been widespread unrest among Orthodox
Ukrainian peasants living on estates belonging to the Roman Catholic
113 Nifontov, p. 101. On popular monarchism among Ukrainian peasants in Chyhyryn
district, Kiev province, in the 1870s, see D. Field, Rebels in the Name of the Tsar, Boston, MA,
and London, 1989, pp. 112–207.
114 KD, p. 605.
115 Dovzhenok, p. 161.
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Church, and they welcomed the measure. In 1844 all state peasants in
the western provinces were transferred from onerous labour services to
fixed cash dues (obrok), thus bringing them into line with state peasants
in the Russian provinces of the empire.116 The governors of Volhynia
and Podolia reported that the transfer of state peasants to obrok had led
to significant improvements in their condition, and that they were
much better off than neighbouring peasants enserfed to Polish
nobles.117 These reforms of the non-seigniorial peasantry seem to have
had some impact on peasants on the estates of Polish nobles in 1848. In
at least four disturbances in 1848, peasants demanded transfer to obrok,
conversion to the state peasantry, or even freedom. Peasants on the
estate of Countess Branicka in Volodymyr-Volyns∞kyi, Volhynia, made
all these demands, and peasants elsewhere made similar demands.118
That there was some basis for the Ukrainian peasants’ apparent faith
in the tsar in 1848 suggests that it was not simply ‘naive’, as many
Soviet scholars asserted.119 On several occasions discussed above,
peasants tried to use their interpretation of the tsar’s intentions in their
disputes with landowners and officials. Moreover, peasants were well
aware, once again, that the Russian authorities were at odds with the
Polish landowners of the region over the inventory reform, and used
the opportunities created to articulate their aims and aspirations. The
Polish landowners, however, had good reason to dislike the inventory
reform, and to see it as the latest of a series of Russian measures
directed at their interests. Several landowners expressed their feelings
about the reform while beating their peasants: ‘Here’s the decree for
you, here’s the sovereign’s favour!’; ‘I’ll put the decree on your back
and beat you until I’ve pulverized the decree and your skin!’; ‘No one
has the right to tell me how to treat you, I can beat my peasant to
death, no one frightens me!’120
The hostile reaction to the inventory reform among the landowners
of right-bank Ukraine was, of course, hardly a surprise to the
authorities. Indeed, they had warned landowners that they would be
held to account if they violated the regulations. Bibikov’s attitude to
Polish landowners is suggested by the following anecdote. When he
116 Druzhinin, Gosudarstvennye krest∞iane, vol. 2, pp. 149–50; Kieniewicz, Emancipation,
pp. 140–50; A. L. Zinchenko, ‘Reforma gosudarstvennoi derevni i sekuliarizatsiia tserkov-
nogo zemlevladeniia v zapadnykh guberniiakh Rossiiskoi imperii’, Istoricheskie zapiski, 112,
1985, pp. 98–125; idem, ‘Z istorii selians∞kogo rukhu na Pravoberezhnii Ukraini u XVIII-
pershoi polovyni XIX st.’, Ukrains∞kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 1991, 1, pp. 36–45.
117 RGIA, f. 1281, op. 4, 1849, d. 130a, l. 46; 1847, d. 80, l. 64ob.; op. 5, 1849, d. 73a, l. 47.
118 KD, p. 602, Glukhovskii, ‘Epizody’, pp. 215–16; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110,
l. 25ob. See also I. O. Hurzhii, ‘Selians∞ki rukhy na Ukraini v pershii polovyni XIX st.’,
Visnyk AN URSR, 1952, 1, pp. 25, 33.
119 See M. Perrie, ‘Popular Monarchism’, in G. Hosking and R. Service (eds), Reinterpreting
Russia, London, 1999, pp. 156–69.
120 Shul∞gin, pp. 100–01; Zaionchkovskii, p. 60; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, l. 39.
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heard that one young nobleman, with a reputation as a playboy, was
not adhering to the inventory regulations, he summoned him to Kiev.
Attributing his action to inadequate knowledge of the regulations,
Bibikov ordered the ‘perplexed dandy’ to come to his office every
morning at nine o’clock, adding: ‘You will be shown to a room, where
you will study [the regulations], and my adjutant (at this point he
glanced at the adjutant who clicked his spurs) will supervise your
studies and listen to what you have learned. At the end of your studies,
I will listen to you myself.’121
In spite of the attitude of the governor-general and the warnings they
had been given, there were many reports throughout 1848 of landown-
ers and their agents infringing the inventory regulations on their
estates.122 Such actions were a major cause, indeed the second most
important cause, of peasant disturbances as reported by officials.
Breaches of the regulations by seigniorial authorities were a factor in
thirty-eight (22 per cent) of the 170 incidents for which officials
reported on the causes. The actual number may have been far higher.
Proximity to the provincial capitals seems to have made it more likely
that breaches came to the attention of the authorities. Twenty-four of
the thirty-eight incidents were in the districts of or adjoining Kiev,
Kam∞ianets-Podil∞s∞kyi and Zhytomyr. This suggests that the authorities
elsewhere may have been less assiduous in uncovering such breaches.
Indeed, police seem to have turned a blind eye in return for bribes. An
anonymous author wrote to Bibikov that in Starokostiantyniv district,
Volhynia, ‘there are barely ten estates where the ‘‘inventory regula-
tions’’ are being fulfilled because all [the landowners] are paying the
police’.123 In April 1848, moreover, Bibikov expressed concern that
peasants were being punished by local officials for complaining about
infringements by their landowners.124 It later transpired that landown-
ers had silenced peasants who complained, or tried to complain, about
their infringements by sending them to the army or penal servitude.125
In thirty of the thirty-eight incidents for which information is more
readily available, landowners or estate authorities demanded obliga-
tions in excess of those set by the regulations. In February landowner
Zakrzewski of Mativ, Volodymyr-Volyns∞kyi district, Volhynia, ordered
his male peasants to work for him for four, rather than three, days a
121 ‘K kharakteristike’, pp. 70–71.
122 In addition to the cases mentioned below, see TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 435 [1848], dd. 51,
70, 88; f. 442, op. 445, 1849, dd. 6–12; f. 442, op. 448 [1848], d. 60; f. 442, op. 451, 1848,
dd. 2, 17, 53.
123 ‘Porushennia’, pp. 110. Only one breach of the regulations by landowners in this
district is recorded in a comprehensive survey of archival sources on peasant unrest in right-
bank Ukraine in 1848. SR, p. 440.
124 TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 435, 1848, d. 56, ll. 12–13 ob.
125 GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., 1849, d. 3, ll. 122–25 ob.
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week. In return for some of the extra days, Zakrzewski bought
exemption for his peasants from the recruiting obligation. He counted
the others as additional summer and construction labour days. He
neglected, however, to inform his peasants of this. He was thus clearly
in breach of articles 2, 15 and 16 of the regulations. Zakrzewski also
required his peasants to work norms which took two days rather than
one. The peasants complained to the authorities, as they had been
instructed, but also refused to work according to the regulations.126
The peasants of Kuz∞myntsi, Kaniv district, Kiev province, com-
plained about the actions of their landowner, Konopacki. He required
peasants who lived in large households containing more than one
married couple to send two peasants, rather than one, to perform
labour services. Some households had performed labour services in this
manner before the reform. Nevertheless, this practice was in breach of
article 2 of the regulations.127 Other landowners demanded norms in
excess of those laid down in the regulations. In February, landowner
Piotrowski forced his peasants in Babychi, Zhytomyr district, Volhynia,
to plough an area of land in sixteen days that they were supposed to
have thirty days to complete. The peasants complained to the
authorities. They also took matters into their own hands and beat up
the steward.128 In February and March several landowners and
stewards provoked protests by ordering peasants to thresh more sheaves
than set by the regulations.129
Some landowners anticipated the stipulation that peasants were to
retain their existing land allotments (article 1) by taking land from them
on the eve of the reform.130 This continued in 1848. In nine of the
incidents in which breaches of the regulations were a factor, landowners
interfered with peasants’ allotments. In at least six cases, peasants
complained to the authorities. All but one of these incidents took place
in the fertile black earth districts, where land was more valuable. In
Zhabotyn, landowner Fijalkowski allegedly took away good land from
his peasants and gave them poor land in exchange.131 In at least one
126 Kornylovych, pp. 246, 247, 249, 252, 264; SR, p. 434.
127 GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, d. 110, l. 43–ob.
128 ‘Porushennia’, p. 109; SR, p. 433.
129 See, for example, SR, pp. 433, 435; KD, pp. 620–22, 805; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848,
d. 110, ll. 63ob., 67–68.
130 Kornylovych, pp. 243–44.
131 Koshik, p. 118.
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incident, the landowner interfered with his peasants’ land allotments as
well as demanding unlawful obligations.132
* * *
A few general conclusions can be made about the relationship between
the inventory reform and the wave of peasant disturbances that
followed. Peasant attitudes to the authorities and, in particular,
awareness of the divisions between higher level Russian officials (and
the tsar) and Polish landowners, were more important than religious
and ethnic tensions between Orthodox, Ukrainian peasants and
Roman Catholic, Polish landowners. These tensions, however, together
with popular recollections of the history of serfdom in Ukraine coloured
the unrest. News of the abolition of serfdom in neighbouring Galicia
may have influenced some peasants in border areas, but overall
peasants were motivated in their protests by the impact of the inventory
reform on their lives, not by events in the rest of Europe in 1848. The
most common cause of unrest was a perception among peasants that
the obligations set by the inventory regulations, especially labour
services and additional summer days, were burdensome. The second
most common factor was breaches of the regulations by landowners
and estate authorities.
Some disturbances were caused in part by misunderstandings of the
regulations, unintentional or deliberate, by peasants. The lack of clarity
of some parts of the regulations and the impracticality of implementing
standard, inflexible regulations throughout the region, were a further
cause of disputes. In preparing the regulations, Bibikov took no account
of the important differences in agriculture, working practices, and rates
of pay between the less fertile north and black earth south of the region.
The inflexibility of the regulations was also demonstrated by the impact
of the cholera epidemic and partial bad harvest in the summer of 1848.
Bibikov’s approach and mindset may have been appropriate to a
parade ground, but the Ukrainian peasants and Polish landowners
were not like soldiers and did not respond to minute regulation.
Bibikov’s approach to rural reforms can be contrasted very unfavoura-
bly with that of Kiselev.
132 GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., 1848, ll. 43–44. For other cases of landowners breaching the
regulations on land allotments, see TsDIAU, f. 442, op. 451, 1848, dd. 2, 17. Landowners
took land from peasants after 1848. A. Z. Baraboi, ‘Obezzemelivanie pomeshchikami
krest∞ian Kievskoi i Podol∞skoi gubernii nakanune i v period revoliutsionnoi situatsii
1859–1861 gg.’ in M. V. Nechkina (ed.), Revoliutsionnaia situatsiia v Rossii v 1859–1861 gg.,
vol. 1, Moscow, 1960, pp. 29–48.
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VI
Some historians, for example Soviet scholar A. Z. Baraboi, have argued
that over the course of 1848 there was a rapprochement between the
Russian authorities and Polish landowners of right-bank Ukraine at the
expense of the peasants, i.e. a reversal of the original aims of the
inventory reform. The reasons for this alleged change, it has been
argued, were the wave of peasant disturbances that threatened law and
order in the region, and the news of the revolutions that had broken
out throughout much of Europe. The Russian government did not
wish to create fertile ground, among nobles or peasants, for the spread
of revolution to its western borderlands.133 This argument is a little too
clear cut, however, and the shift in the attitude of the Russian
authorities was more subtle. On 29 March 1848, in the wake of the
outbreak of revolutions in Europe, Nicholas I ordered that ‘the slightest
spark of insubordination’ among the peasantry of right-bank Ukraine
was to be strictly punished.134 The authorities strove to contain and
suppress the wave of peasant disturbances. Rising levels of pressure
were applied to ‘insubordinate’ peasants, starting with exhortations by
district level officials, then more senior officials, culminating in extreme
cases in exemplary punishment of the alleged ‘ringleaders’, including
running the gauntlet, and billeting of troops in villages to ensure the
continued obedience of their inhabitants.135 There was, however, never
any question that Ukrainian peasants who disobeyed their landowners
or the state authorities would not be punished. Whether the punish-
ments meted out to peasants were more severe than might have been
the case, but for the European revolutions, is difficult to assess.
Comparisons with the suppression of disturbances in villages in right-
bank Ukraine before the spring of 1848 and elsewhere in the Russian
Empire in the 1840s136 suggests that they were not.
Measures were taken against the interests of Polish landowners long
after the start of the peasant rebellions and after the news of the
outbreak of revolutions in Europe. On 15 July, during the wave of
peasant protests against the additional labour days in the summer,
Bibikov asked marshals of the nobility to persuade landowners to make
concessions like that of landowner Fijalkowski, who had reduced
additional summer days from two to one a week.137 Moreover, official
investigations were carried out throughout 1848 into cases where
133 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, pp. 114–19. See also Dovzhenok, p. 155; Beauvois,
pp. 34–36.
134 Shcherbatov, p. 213.
135 Measures to restore order were the main topic of official reports. See, for example, SR,
pp. 288, 292, 350–51.
136 See SR and KD.
137 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, p. 116.
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landowners breached the regulations. A few estate officials and
landowners were reprimanded or punished for violations of the law.138
The punishments handed down to recalcitrant Polish nobles were not
as harsh as those for peasants convicted of rebellion. This does
not suggest a change in attitude over 1848, however, but simply
reflected the existing Russian law that nobles, unlike peasants, were
exempt from corporal punishment.139 In a decree of 15 October
1848,140 however, Nicholas I did take actions in the landowners’ favour.
He ordered all investigations into abuses of seigniorial authority that
had taken place before the implementation of the inventory reform to
be stopped, and that all estates which had been taken into trusteeship
(opeka) for this reason be returned to their owners at the discretion of
district marshals of the nobility. On the other hand, investigations by
the authorities in Kiev into breaches by landowners of the inventory
regulations continued. By the end of 1848, however, only twelve estates
in the three provinces were in trusteeship because of abuses by their
owners, suggesting that the authorities were either being lenient or slow
to act.141 In a further concession, Nicholas I ordered that rights be
restored to landowners who had been banned from local noble elections
because of involvement in the 1830–31 revolt.
Nevertheless, Bibikov does not seem to have altered his overall views
on the reform. On 12 October 1848 he sent Nicholas I a lengthy report
surveying his actions as governor-general since his appointment to
Kiev a decade earlier. In the section on the inventory reform, he
staunchly defended the measure and its original aims. He acknowl-
edged that there had been disorders during the first year of the
inventories. But, he alleged that, after the Polish landowners had heard
news of the revolutions abroad, they had cynically provoked distur-
bances among the peasantry in order to discredit the reform in hope of
persuading the authorities to take their side against the peasants and
withdraw the inventories. In contrast to his picture of the treasonous
Poles, Bibikov portrayed the peasants as naive and gullible, rather than
wilfully disobedient. He advocated that, in the long run, the peasants
should be removed from Polish influence altogether to ensure their
loyalty to the ‘Orthodox Russian tsar’.142
Bibikov and other senior Russian officials were well aware, from the
detailed reports they received, of many of the particular problems with
138 See, for example, KD, pp. 630, 647 n. 431; GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp., d. 110, ll. 69–ob.;
1849, d. 3, l. 124.
139 S. P. Frank, ‘Emancipation and the Birch: The Perpetuation of Corporal Punishment
in Rural Russia 1861–1907’, Jahrbu¨cher fu¨r Geschichte Osteuropas, 45, 1997, pp. 401–16.
140 PSZ, 2, vol. 23, pt. 2, pp. 646–47 (no. 22,652, 15 October 1848). I am grateful to Prof.
David Saunders for this reference.
141 RGIA, f. 1281, op. 4, 1849, d. 84a, l. 47; d. 130a, ll. 19, 63; op. 5, 1849, d. 73a, ll. 66–67.
142 RGIA, f. 1263, op. 1, d. 1955, ll. 455–60. See also ‘Obozrenie’, pp. 34–35.
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the inventory regulations that had led to some of the disturbances,
especially those where the regulations had seemed inappropriate or
unclear.143 In order to address some of the problems thus revealed,
revised inventory regulations were drawn up and ratified by the tsar on
29 December 1848.144 The revised regulations were longer than those
issued in May 1847, containing sixty-five rather than forty-four articles.
Some of the changes clarified issues that had led to problems.
The revised regulations went into much more detail on peasants’
land allotments (articles 1, 3–10). Standard (normal ∞nyi) sizes for land
allotments for each category of household, sufficient for their needs,
were to be set for each estate. Those of polutiaglie households’ were to
be no less than half the size of tiaglie households’ allotments. Land-
owners were now permitted to exchange parts of households’ land
allotments, but only for the same quantity and quality of land in the
same area. New categories of households, with larger land allotments
and higher labour obligations than tiaglie, were now permitted. All
changes in peasant’ allotments had to be by mutual agreement, and
have the consent of the local authorities. Alterations were also made to
peasants’ obligations. The problems in enforcing some of the work
norms were addressed. The regulation on threshing norms was
amended to include winnowing, and taking the straw away (article 8,
viii and ix). The ambiguity over when landowners could demand
construction labour days was resolved by stating clearly that ‘times of
field work’, during which they were not permitted, meant only harvest
time. Moreover, landowners could demand only one construction day
a week (article 24). Bibikov’s alternative harvesting norms, measured
not in land area but in numbers of sheaves, were added to the
regulations. Land area was cut from 1/9th to 1/10th of a desiatina. The
number of sheaves was to be used on estates which had not been
surveyed with sufficient accuracy. The predicament of how peasants
could be required to reap a set number of sheaves if the harvest was
poor was dealt with by stating that, in such cases, they were to reap as
much as they could manage (article 8, vi). The revised regulations also
changed the peasants’ obligation to work additional days in the summer
by cutting the number landowners could demand in any one week from
two to one. Moreover, cotters’ additional summer days were to be
counted against their other labour obligations. But the total number of
summer days peasants had to work, twelve, and the rates of pay, were
left unchanged (articles 18–20).
143 For general reports on problems that reached St Petersburg, see GARF, f. 109, 4 eksp.,
1848, d. 110, ll. 73–81 ob.; RGIA, f. 18, 1848, op. 2, d. 1328, ll. 7–11.
144 ‘Inventarnye polozheniia zapadnykh gubernii’, in Pervoe izdanie materialov redaktsionnykh
kommissii, 4, pp. 191–211.
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Landowners were instructed to prepare new estate inventories on
the basis of the new regulations and submit them to Bibikov for
approval. This took nearly four years. Unlike the original regulations
and estate inventories, the revised regulations and new inventories
were not read out to the peasants.145 It can be surmised that this was in
an attempt to prevent peasants misunderstanding them. District
marshals of the nobility were made responsible for settling any
‘misunderstandings’ that did arise (article 11). A few further changes
were made. From January 1849, stewards needed to prove their
worthiness to manage estates, and were banned from administering
corporal punishment.146 In 1850, landowners were banned from
increasing obligations where the inventory regulations specified higher
dues than those demanded before 1848.147
Baraboi and others have argued that the revised regulations of
December 1848 favoured the landowners, and were further evidence
for a rapprochement between the Russian authorities and the Polish
landowners.148 Such an assessment is too one-sided, and does not pay
sufficient attention to the changes that went some way to addressing
problems peasants had experienced, and drawn attention to by their
actions, in 1848. Along with other scholars, however, Baraboi also
noted how landowners violated the new regulations. In particular,
some took advantage of the provision permitting landowners to
exchange parts of their peasants’ allotments in order to seize land from
them. But it can be argued that the problem lay, not in the revised
regulations, but in the way they were enforced by lower-level officials,
a problem that was not addressed in 1848.149 To the extent that, from
1848, there was a slight ‘zig zag’ in policy, with a switch towards the
interests of the of right-bank Ukraine landowners, it was part of a
broader trend throughout the empire prompted by Nicholas I’s
reaction to the 1848 revolutions. The relatively minor revisions to the
inventory regulations in December 1848, moreover, were nowhere
near as clear cut as the virtual repeal in early 1849 of the empire-wide
law of November 1847 that had permitted enserfed peasants to buy
their land and freedom at auctions. This step signalled the end of
significant measures to address the ‘peasant question’ until the accession
of Alexander II in 1855.150
145 Semevskii, p. 503.
146 Semevskii, p. 507.
147 O. P. Kryzhanivs∞kyi, Inventarna reforma 1847–1848 rr. u Volyns∞kii hubernii, unpublished
candidate dissertation, Kiev State University, 1970 [Avtoreferat], p. 14.
148 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, pp. 117–18.
149 ‘Pravoberezhnaia Ukraina’, p. 118. See also Semevskii, pp. 503–04.
150 Russian Peasants, pp. 71–108, 205.
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The main beneficiary of the inventory reform was Bibikov himself.
In August 1852 he was promoted to serve as Minister of Internal
Affairs. Shortly before he left Kiev for St Petersburg he made a speech
to the noble assemblies of the three provinces of right-bank Ukraine.
Referring to the reform, he diplomatically blamed breaches of the
regulations not on nobles but their estate managers, stewards and
leaseholders. He concluded: ‘Popularity I did not seek, your love I do
not have, but I hope [I have your] respect. Future generations will
remember my service in this region.’ Indeed, stories about Bibikov
circulated for decades.151 Bibikov tried to use his new post to speed up
the introduction of compulsory estate inventories in the other western
provinces. In a move typical of his impatience, on 22 December 1852
he ordered that the revised regulations approved for right-bank
Ukraine on 29 December 1848 be extended to the Belorussian and
Lithuanian provinces. This served only to galvanize opposition from
the largely Polish nobility, especially since the regulations of December
1848 were not appropriate to these regions. When Bibikov was
dismissed as Minister of Internal Affairs in 1855, he had still not
succeeded in extending the inventory reform beyond right-bank
Ukraine.152
VII
The inventory reform of 1847–48 did not succeed in either of its aims
to resolve both the peasant and the Polish problems in right-bank
Ukraine. Rather, the experience of the reform, and the responses it
provoked among the peasantry, nobility and officialdom, served to
emphasize the difficulties posed by these problems for the imperial
Russian state. Peasant unrest continued in the region after 1848. The
most dramatic example was the ‘Kiev cossackdom’ of 1855, when
thousands of seigniorial peasants tried, illegally, to join the state militia
in the hope of becoming ‘cossacks’. During the disorders that ensued,
some peasants tried to find the revised inventory regulations and estate
inventories that had been concealed from them after 1848.153 The
inventory reform did make a significant contribution to the abolition of
serfdom throughout the Russian Empire. In 1857, under the renewed
151 ‘Rech∞ D. G. Bibikova k Dvorianstvu Iugo-Zapadnogo Kraia’, Kievskaia Starina, 2, June
1882, pp. 534–35; ‘K kharakteristike’; RBS 3, pp. 23–25.
152 See V. I. Neupokoev, Krest ∞ianskii vopros v Litve vo vtoroi treti XIX veka, Moscow, 1976;
N. N. Ulashchik, ‘Vvedenie obiazatel∞nykh inventarei v Belorussii i Litve’, Ezhegodnik po
agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy, 1858 g., Tallinn, 1959, pp. 256–77.
153 See SR, pp. 451–58; M. N. Leshchenko (ed.), Selians∞kyi rukh na Ukraini, 1850–1861 rr.:
Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv, Kiev, 1988.
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threat of extending the inventories to Lithuania, the local Polish nobles
made a proposal to abolish serfdom without land for the peasants, on
the Baltic model. This gave Alexander II the opportunity to issue his
famous rescript to Governor-General V. I. Nazimov of Lithuania, in
which he laid down principles for a reform more favourable to the
peasants. This set in motion the process that led to the eventual
legislation of 1861.154 In addition, the reformers drew on the experience
of the inventory reform in the preparation of the more far-reaching
reform. The statutes of 1861 laid down a lengthy process for ending
serfdom. It included an intermediate stage of ‘temporary obligation’,
during which relations between landowners and peasants were regu-
lated according to charters (ustavnye gramoty). These charters were
broadly similar to the estate inventories, but were prepared for each
estate individually on the basis of general principles rather than a rigid,
standard model.155
The inventory reform, and the associated measures enacted after the
Polish revolt of 1830–31, did not end the threat posed by Polish
nationalism to Russian rule of the western provinces. Poles rose again
in revolt in the Kingdom of Poland in 1863. The rebels proposed
further measures in the interests of the peasants. The insurrection
spread to the western provinces, including right-bank Ukraine. But, as
in 1831, most Ukrainian peasants did not support the Polish insurgents,
and many assisted the Russian authorities against them.156 This time
the Russian authorities took more decisive action in favour of the
peasants against their Polish owners. The terms of the abolition of
serfdom of 1861 were revised for all the western provinces. The
intermediate stage of ‘temporary obligation’ was brought to a prema-
ture end, and peasants moved straight to the redemption operation,
which enabled them to buy their land outright through the intermediary
of the government. Moreover, peasants were allowed to purchase more
land from nobles, and at a lower price, than had originally been
envisaged.157 In the decades after the 1863 revolt, the Russian
government continued to promote the interests of the local peasants at
the expense of the Polish nobles. For many Russian officials, for
example M. N. Muraviev, ‘the basic issue in the Western Provinces was
154 See D. Field, The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855–1861,
Cambridge, MA, 1976, pp. 77–83.
155 Pervoe izdanie materialov redaktsionnykh kommissii, 4; Otmena, pp. 97–169; B. G. Litvak,
Perevorot 1861 goda v Rossii, Moscow, 1991, pp. 128–51 (hereafter Perevorot). For further
discussion of this point, see D. Moon, The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia, forthcoming.
156 Kieniewicz, Emancipation, pp. 154–69.
157 Otmena, pp. 284–89; Perevorot, pp. 175–76.
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the liberation of the local ‘‘Russian’’ population from Polish oppres-
sion’.158 This policy created another dilemma for the Russian authori-
ties since, contrary to their perceptions, the local peasants were not
Russian. Official fears that the tiny Ukrainian intelligentsia would
promote ‘a specifically Ukrainian (rather than Russian) consciousness
among Ukrainian peasants’ were probably the main reason why the
authorities suppressed the use of the Ukrainian language in print in the
Russian Empire until 1905.159 Moreover, the peasants of right-bank
Ukraine had shown repeatedly that they could not be disregarded or
taken for granted. The ‘disturbances’ of 1848 are a very good example
of this. Despite official concerns about the identities and actions of
Ukrainian peasants, however, Polish nobles were seen as the greater
threat. As a result, from 1863, the traditional Russian policy of co-
opting social e´lites in the non-Russian borderlands of its empire was
abandoned throughout the lands that had been annexed from Poland-
Lithuania in the 1790s.160 The reversal of policy began after the Polish
revolt of 1830–31, leading to the inventory reform of 1847–48. This
measure, however, was a less dramatic and at best only partly successful
attempt to ensure the loyalty of the peasantry of right-bank Ukraine to
the Russian Empire.
158 T. R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the
Western Frontier, 1863–1914, DeKalb, IL, 1996, pp. 71–72 (hereafter Weeks). See also ibid.,
pp. 47–50, 57–58, 98.
159 D. Saunders, ‘Russia’s Ukrainian Policy (1847–1905): A Demographic Approach’,
European History Quarterly, 25, 1995, pp. 200–01.
160 See Hosking, pp. 376–80; Weeks, passim.
